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DIGITAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM†
This Essay, written for a festschrift celebrating the career and contributions of
Stephen Burbank, grapples with the procedural implications of the steady advance of
digital legal technologies, or “legal tech,” within the civil justice system. From AI-fired
tools that perform e-discovery and predict case outcomes to the migration from inperson to “virtual” proceedings accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, few would
disagree that civil litigation in 2030 will look different than it did at the start of 2020.
Proceeding from this core insight, this Essay sketches two types of procedural reckonings
that lie ahead as new digital technologies move from the periphery to the center of the
civil justice system. One I call traffic rules—rules that determine how and when parties
are moved from in-person court proceedings to new online fora. Second are
information rules that govern the availability, exchange, and use of information in a
fast-digitizing litigation system that will produce more and more of it, but often in
unevenly distributed ways. At least initially, and for reasons Professor Burbank has
long identified, the process of adapting analog versions of these traffic and information
rules to a digital world is likely to remain the province of judges, particularly trial
judges operating within the considerable pools of discretion American procedure affords
them. But in time, digitization will place significant pressure on American ways of
procedure-making. As judges decide how much to weigh party consent in moving
parties online, which machine outputs are protected work product, or which cases to
push to online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms and with what algorithmic tools to
inform parties about their likely prospects in court, the question will be whether judges
can tailor old rules to new digital contexts or whether more sweeping changes to those
rules, or even entirely new governance and oversight regimes, might be warranted. In
making these decisions, judges—and, in time, rulemakers and legislators—will help
chart the digital future of the civil justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
“Crisis rhetoric” has long pervaded debate over American civil
procedure.1 But amidst the hue and cry, a small set of voices has broken
through, rigorously but passionately excavating the deep structure of
American procedure-making. That group’s unrivaled leader is Steve Burbank.
No scholar has done more to map the tectonics of the system—its explicit and
implicit siting of discretion, its separation of powers subtleties, and its
capacity (some would say incapacity) for empirically informed judgment
about the consequences of rule choices. More importantly, no single scholarly
voice oﬀers a better springboard for thinking about what the next era of civil
procedure might hold. And it is precisely clear-eyed thinking that is needed
now, as a potent new force enters the stage: the steady advance of digital legal
technologies, or “legal tech” for short, within the civil justice system. From
AI-ﬁred tools that perform e-discovery and predict case outcomes to the
migration from in-person court proceedings to “virtual” ones accelerated by
the COVID-19 pandemic, few would disagree that civil litigation in 2030 will
look diﬀerent from civil litigation at the start of 2020. Lawyers, judges, and
academics should begin thinking about how the civil justice system will
change—and how civil procedure and its study may need to adapt in response.
This Essay argues that the digitization of the civil justice system will be
particularly fraught because of a dynamic that has come to preoccupy a new
generation of procedure scholars, but one that Professor Burbank has
articulated and analyzed for decades. In a procedural system committed to
transsubstantive, “general” rules and run through with anxieties about
substance-speciﬁc procedure, decision-making discretion that accounts for
modern litigation’s multitudinous forms must be injected back into the system
1 Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 762, 819-21 (1993).

2021]

Digital Civil Procedure

2245

somewhere. And that means judges, and more speciﬁcally trial judges, get to
make it up as they go.2 Whether pervasive judicial discretion is a good thing
or bad thing—and opinion runs the gamut3—large swathes of American
procedure have become a common law enterprise or even improvisational and
“ad hoc,” ﬁt to purpose for a particular case, with little appellate oversight at
the back end.4
Proceeding from this core insight, this Essay sketches two types of rule
reckonings that lie ahead as new digital technologies move from the periphery
to the heart of the civil justice system. One I call traﬃc rules—rules that
determine how and when parties are moved from in-person court proceedings
to new online fora. Second are information rules that govern the exchange of

2

The best overall statement, by Professor Burbank, is worth citing at length:
It is not surprising that, with some notable exceptions, the trend of modern
procedural law has been away from rules that make policy choices towards those that
confer on trial courts a substantial amount of normative discretion. For once one has
settled upon trans-substantive rules as the best way of achieving uniformity, simplicity
and predictability, and once one acknowledges the impact of procedure on the
substantive law, concerns about either the legitimacy of the enterprise or its eﬃcacy
push in that direction. Moreover, in a system dominated, as modern American
procedure has been dominated, by equity, the avoidance of prospective policy choices
holds the promise that justice may be done, with procedure its servant rather than
master.
Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decisionmaking by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial
sense.

Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
3 Compare Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 208385 (1989) (defending judicial discretion), with Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at
Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1986 (2007) (noting judicial discretion’s failings,
from bounded rationality and information asymmetries to “strategic interaction eﬀects”). For a
classic account of judicial discretion, see generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971).
4 In addition to Of Rules and Discretion, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American
Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
The Transformation of Civil Procedure] (“The Federal Rules may appear uniform, but many of them
merely empower district judges to make ad hoc decisions.”), and Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of
Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1st ed. 1985)) (“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are
trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.”). For a sampling of a newer generation of scholars
navigating these waters, see Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 767 (2017), Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2 (2019), Shirin
Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018),
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261 (2010), and
Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018).
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information in a rapidly digitizing litigation system that will produce more
and more of it, from e-discovery to case outcome predictions, but often in
unevenly distributed ways. At least initially, and for reasons Professor
Burbank has long identiﬁed, the process of adapting analog versions of these
traﬃc and information rules to a digital world is likely to remain the province
of judges, particularly trial judges, operating within the considerable pools of
discretion aﬀorded them by American procedure. But in time, digitization
will place signiﬁcant pressure on American ways of procedure-making. As
judges decide how much to weigh party consent in moving parties online,
which machine outputs are protected work product, or which cases to push to
online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms and with what algorithmic tools
to inform parties about their likely prospects in court to facilitate settlement,
the question will be whether judges can tailor existing rules to new digital
contexts or whether more sweeping changes to the rules, or even entirely new
governance and oversight regimes, might be warranted. In making these
decisions, judges—and, in time, rulemakers and legislators—will help chart
the digital future of the civil justice system.
As we contend with these rule reckonings and usher in a new digital civil
procedure, there is no better guide than Professor Burbank and no better
example than his magisterial body of scholarship. To read that work is to
enroll in a master class in the great vectors of American procedure: discretion,
power, complexity, and transsubstantivity. Those contributions alone would
be the envy of any legal scholar. But to stop there would drastically
shortchange the breadth and depth of his contributions. For one can also read
his work as an extended methodological exhortation. Sometimes, this took
the form of old-fashioned spadework in primary sources. Faced with a
towering, elegant, and altogether Ely-esque account of the Rules Enabling
Act,5 Burbank replied with a 180-page excavation of the Act’s decades long
gestation and decisively showed its primary purpose was to allocate power
prospectively between Court and Congress, not to protect past lawmaking or
state substantive law.6 Roll up your sleeves, his work announced, and you get
to places that raw intellect and a powerful pen alone cannot. No less
important has been his exemplary eﬀorts, without formal methods training,
to embrace harder-edged empiricism. Amidst growing but largely anecdotal
concern about American procedure-making, Burbank, working with Sean
Farhang, popped the hood and oﬀered a superhumanly rigorous accounting
of the engine of its three main institutional actors: Advisory Committee,

John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025, 1106 (1982)
(noting the Enabling Act’s core “equable division” purpose) [hereinafter Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act].
5
6
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Court, and Congress.7 Many proceduralists, of course, have called for an
empirical turn in research, most famously Geoﬀrey Hazard back in 1963 as
behavioralist social science gathered steam.8 But Professor Burbank has done
more than make empirical calls. Leading by example, he has embodied them.
As with his work on the Enabling Act’s origins, sweat equity, not cheap talk,
deﬁnes his scholarship.
It’s at that intersection—a deep understanding of power and discretion,
on the one hand; methodological innovation, on the other—that rests the
future of civil procedure as new technologies sweep into the system.
Digitization of litigation will press on all of the tensions in American
procedure-making that Professor Burbank has charted. It will enﬂame
separation of powers conﬂict. It will open up new and worrying distributive
dynamics. It will defy American procedure’s claims to neutrality and its
bracketing of resource asymmetries at the altar of adversarialism. It will
generate litigation alternatives that further erode the monopoly position of
judge and court and test our commitment to public deliberative exercises and
reason giving. And it will test the system’s ability to make empirical
judgments even as it creates oceans of new data that require new methods to
unpack and interrogate. Most important of all, it will bring sustained and
powerful pressure on the key questions at the heart of Professor Burbank’s
scholarly work: not just what the rules should be, but who gets to make them.
It is hard to imagine a more ﬁtting forum, or a better way to begin to think
through these questions as litigation enters the digital era, than a celebration
of Professor Burbank’s inspired leadership as a lawyer and legal scholar on
each of these fronts.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes where
American procedure has been, as masterfully surveyed by Professor Burbank.
Part II looks to the future and describes two types of rule reckonings, across
7 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 19 (2017).
8 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (1963) (describing the
state of procedural research at the time as “groping in a fog”). Hazard, of course, is not the only
example. The Pound Conference in 1906 featured such calls. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 337 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). And those calls have
continued. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986) (“Lawyers, including
judges and law professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches—which in honesty we
should admit are often little better than prejudices—to systematic empirical testing.”); Marc
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1155 (1996) (“A fund of
basic information about the working of our legal institutions, of a sort that we take for granted in
discussions of the economy, or health care, or education, simply does not exist.”); David Freeman
Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204
(2013) (calling for more rigorous research about the eﬀect of Twombly’s plausibility pleading regime).
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three new contexts, that lie ahead in a rapidly digitizing litigation system. Part
III steps back and asks what role procedure scholars might play as those
reckonings sort out, returning once more to Professor Burbank’s field-shaping
leadership as a guide.
I. DISCRETION, POWER, AND METHOD IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
To think about where American procedure might go in a fast-digitizing
litigation system, one must ﬁrst take stock of where it has been and where it
currently sits. A trio of slow-moving but powerful tectonic trends—
deepening judicial discretion, procedure’s steady politicization, and
increasing but still imperfect empirical transparency over the system’s
workings—have deﬁned the last century of American procedure, and
Professor Burbank has brilliantly mapped each.
A. Judicial Discretion
First and foremost are growing pools of judicial discretion. Some of this
expansion has come in the clear light of day, in marquee Supreme Court
decisions expanding the role of dispositive motions: ﬁrst summary judgment,
blessed in the Court’s 1986 Celotex trilogy,9 then motions to dismiss via the
advent of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal.10 Some of it has taken
more diﬀuse and less tractable forms. Managerial judging, once bitterly
debated, has become the norm in complex litigations, buoyed by amendments
to Rule 16 and 26 giving judges substantial control over the pacing,
sequencing, and settlement of litigation.11 Deepening pools of judicial
discretion have also spilled into the exotic. Nearly all of the devices that have
evolved in multidistrict litigation (MDL), from plaintiﬀ steering committees
to bellwether trials to Lone Pine orders, are nowhere authorized by rule or
statute and rarely subject to meaningful appellate review.12
9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 327 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1986).
10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-80 (2009).
11 For a classic account, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
Managerial judgment has spilled over into trial too. See Thornburg, supra note 4, at 1261-62 (“[T]he
philosophy underlying managerial judging has expanded into the trial phase . . . .”); Nora
Freeman Engstrom, The Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L.J. 933, 937 (2018) (arguing that
Judith Resnick’s “managerial thesis” has expanded to include the trial period).
12 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 4, at 44 (“A trial judge can use a Lone Pine order to terminate
a case while insulating herself from meaningful appellate review.”); David L. Noll, MDL as Public
Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 422 (“Many decisions in MDL are eﬀectively immune from
appellate review.”) (2019); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1688-89 (2017) (noting that
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But the trend toward judicial discretion is no less evident beyond the elite
precincts of mass torts MDLs or antitrust class actions, in the smaller-bore,
workaday litigation contexts that make up the bulk of the work of American
courts. A good example comes in judicial treatment of pro se litigants—a
burning issue arising out the staggering fact that, in three-quarters of the
millions of civil cases ﬁled in state courts each year, at least one party is
unrepresented.13 A growing literature catalogs the varying ways judges
manage this pro se parade, particularly the degree to which they adopt a more
active inquisitorial posture or a more passive and adversarial one, with little
guidance or rules structuring that choice.14
Caveats apply. Judicial discretion’s ascension has hardly been straight line.
Going all the way back to 1938, the merger of equity and law constrained some
of the open-ended discretion of the former.15 More recently, the rise of private
procedural ordering has narrowed judicial discretion and power outside of a
designated “core” of procedure said to sit beyond the power of parties to
change.16 For instance, party control over forum selection has plainly
increased, and judicial discretion curtailed, both inside the court system, via

MDLs are an example of “procedural exceptionalism,” as there is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
speciﬁc to MDLs, and the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, concerns when MDLs are authorized
but does not mention the procedures, from bellwether trials to plaintiﬀ steering committees, that
judges deploy for case management and resolution).
13 Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves, & Shelley Spacek Miller, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., at iv, vi, 32 (2015), https://
www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
E3CZ-HRJQ]. Pro se rates in federal court are roughly twenty-ﬁve to thirty percent. See Mark D.
Gough & Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates of Pro Se Litigation in Federal Court, 45 LAW &
SOC. INQ. 567, 574-75 (2020).
14 Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the
“New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 252-53 (2018); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown
and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 903 (2016); Anna E.
Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647, 651, 655-56 (2017).
15 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975-82, 1000-03 (1987); AMALIA D. KESSLER,
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL
CULTURE, 1800-1877, at 9 (2017).
16 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1382 (2012); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L.
REV. 723, 783-85 (2011); Michael L. Moﬃtt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 467-91 (2007); Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal
Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private
Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 570 (2009). Interestingly, because the
overwhelming majority of state court litigants are unrepresented, privatized procedure (beyond
arbitration clauses) is more a federal-level phenomenon. See Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica Steinberg,
Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1315-17 (making this point).
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the presumptive validity of forum selection clauses,17 and outside of it, via the
presumptive enforceability of arbitration clauses.18 Finally, key areas of
procedure, particularly discovery, are perhaps best characterized as within
mutual party control, with judicial discretion entering the mix only
episodically, when disputes arise.19 Still, each of these areas is dwarfed by the
far more numerous procedures, beginning with dispositive motions and
MDLs but extending well beyond, where judges have accrued vast authority
as ﬁnal procedural arbiters: service of process, ﬁling deadlines, consolidation
and separation of actions, attorney misconduct, interlocutory appeals, class
settlements, new trials, and the core pacing and sequencing of litigation. Few
could disagree that, on net, the story of nearly a century of American
procedure has been the steady accretion of judicial discretion at the expense
of lawyers, litigants, juries, and rulemakers.
Why this has happened is a harder question, but two explanations stand
out. Some (including Professor Burbank) would say it was cooked from the
start, the inevitable result of the system’s foundational transprocedural
commitments: that “general” rules should be uniformly applicable across
courts and cases and that those rules can only be made or changed through
the Enabling Act process.20 Of course, uniformly applied rules bring beneﬁts,
among them a stable backdrop against which Congress and President can
legislate substance.21 But there are consequences. Because departures from
general and uniform rules are disfavored or even prohibited and raise
troubling questions of institutional power and legitimacy, the only way to
account for modern litigation’s many forms, and the only way around a
hopeless and ineﬀectual formalism, is judicial discretion.
Institutional fragmentation has also contributed. In public choice terms,
judges may be the least fragmented of the power players. As political
17 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991); Atl. Marine Constr.
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63-66 (2013). For an analysis of how Atlantic Marine swept away
judicial discretion to consider private interest factors under § 1404(a) in cases with forum selection
clauses, see Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 675,
677 (2015).
18 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344-45, 352 (2011); Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619, 1621-22 (2018).
19 For a careful recent analysis and a review of this literature, see generally Robin J. Effron,
Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2018).
For a classic statement of American adversarialism, see John H. Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830 (1985) that compares the German procedural system
to an Anglo-American procedure built on “partisan presentation of evidence to a passive and
ignorant trier.”
20 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535,
536 (2009) [Burbank, “General Rules”].
21 David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191,
1211, 1235 (2013).
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polarization has plunged Congress into dysfunction and gridlock, and as the
legal profession has become ever more specialized and balkanized,22 only
judges, with their relative homogeneity, political insulation, and streamlined
decision processes and simple majority rules, can put up something like a
united front.23
Importantly, judges and judicial discretion win out even when other
stakeholders rise up. In the great procedure battles of the 1980s and 1990s,
Congress was wrested from its slumber on procedural matters when lawyers,
enraged by the Advisory Committee’s “cavalier” and unempirical
“tinkerings”24 with Rule 11 and Rule 26, learned to pull legislative “ﬁre
alarms.”25 In turn, legislators learned that procedure is power.26 The twin
result has been increasing legislative pushback in the rulemaking process27
and legislative incursions, from the silo-speciﬁc Prison Litigation Reform Act
22 As Burbank showed, the diversiﬁcation and specialization not only shrank the community
of interest among lawyers, but also ensured that the views of bench and bar on key procedural
matters would diverge as well. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1720 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power]
(“[T]he legal profession became less homogeneous, more competitive, and more specialized, and the
communities of interest among lawyers and between lawyers and judges shrank.”); Stephen B.
Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 853
(1993) [hereinafter Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform] (“[I]t may no longer make sense
to talk about the legal profession in connection with procedural reform.”); Stephen B. Burbank,
Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 514 (1996) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure and Power]
(noting legal profession at time of 1938 rules was “small and homogeneous, or at least was a
recognizable profession”).
23 This is not to say that courts are entirely insulated. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL
OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367-68 (1st ed. 2009).
24 Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context:
The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 680 (1997).
25 Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1704 (“[L]awyers, members of an
increasingly diverse and fragmented (through specialization and competition) profession, came to
believe that the rulemakers (who had come to be dominated by judges) were not listening, and they
turned to Congress for relief from proposals to which they objected.”); id. at 1722 (“The risk of a
rupture between federal judges and the bar was realized when, in response to a perceived crisis of
expense and delay, judges pursued rulemaking strategies that either empowered them at the expense
of lawyers and their clients (sanctions and active case management) or that simply disempowered
lawyers (discovery reform).”).
26 In particular, Congress sought to reassert their authority and move the system toward one
that more closely approximates delegated legislative power than “inherent” judicial power. See id. at
1705 (“[L]obbying by lawyers and others led members of Congress to perceive that some issues of
court practice and procedure either could be used to generate political support among certain
interest groups or in any event might require attention in order to preserve such support.”); id. at
1679-89.
27 Witness, for instance, Congress’s pushback against the Federal Rules of Evidence or
proposed procedural amendments in 1983 and 1993. See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural
Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 228 (1997) [hereinafter, Burbank,
Implementing Procedural Change] (recounting growing “power struggles” around FRE, Rule 11, and
CJRA).
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and Private Securities Litigation Reform to the more transsubstantive Civil
Justice Reform Act and Class Action Fairness Act.28 To be sure, congressional
meddling has at times cabined judicial discretion. But judges have, on net,
beneﬁtted from separation of powers struggles. Conﬂict between Congress
and rulemakers led to the opening up of the rulemaking process in 1988 and
its assimilation to administrative law’s notice-and-comment model.29 While
some say this change pressed the rulemakers into narrower and more
technocratic poses, it may have also had the larger eﬀect of delegitimating
rulemaking by rendering it little diﬀerent, at least viewed from the outside,
from the pull and haul of “normal” politics.30
B. Procedure and Power
Underwriting each of these explanations for growing pools of judicial
discretion is the second great tectonic trend of the last century of American
procedure, and another one that has beneﬁted from Professor Burbank’s
masterful analysis: a fundamental shift in the civil justice landscape, rooted
in the growing American reliance on courts and litigation to make and
implement social policies.
Once again, there are high and low precincts. The usual high precinct
version of the story, anchored by the groundbreaking scholarly work of
Robert Kagan, Sean Farhang, and Professor Burbank, is that the American
political system has increasingly turned to private enforcement to compensate
individuals for wrongs and enforce key social norms.31 The American reliance
on litigation, on this account, is not a runaway result of lawyer avarice or a
“victim society,” as some would have it.32 It is a deliberate legislative
See Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1693-1703.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74.
See Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 22, at 849-50 (1993) (arguing
that, far from helping Congress to disengage on procedural matters, rulemaking’s new guise may
have encouraged legislators “to second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it”); see also
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1724 (“[T]he changes in the rulemaking
process in the 1980s that were designed to open it up to more and more diverse points of view, make
it more transparent, and diminish the need for congressional involvement, may in fact have
facilitated a process of redundancy wherein participants treat rulemaking that is at all controversial
as merely the ﬁrst act.”).
31 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 39 (2d
ed. 2019) (explaining the American penchant for court- and litigation-centered regulatory
approaches). See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (explaining the post-war American turn to litigation and
its consequences).
32 See, e.g., WALTER OLSEN, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997); KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1992); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL
JUSTICE (1985).
28
29
30
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regulatory choice. Whatever the relative contribution of these various
potential causes, note the eﬀect: the deepening role of litigation as a vehicle
of American social policymaking has steadily sharpened anxieties about
substance-speciﬁc rulemaking by continually raising the specter that
judicially chosen procedures are altering legislative bargains. Battles over
Rule 11 and Rule 26 might have gotten lawyers’ backs up and helped Congress
to see political power and advantage in procedure. Beneath it all, however, is
a slower burn of politicization of procedure born of the American turn to
private attorneys general in key—hotly contested—regulatory battlegrounds.
The lower-precinct version of the story often gets lost in accounts of the
postwar litigation turn, but it is no less important. As economic inequality
has widened and poverty deepened, a diﬀerent kind of social policymaking
has been judicialized. American courts have become de facto social welfare
bureaucracies—perennially ﬂooded by a tsunami of consumer debt, eviction,
and family law cases, but without the governance tools or staﬀs that agencies
sitting in the other branches of government can tap to manage them.33
Importantly, this lower-precinct trend is connected to the higher-precinct
one by more than just the judicialization of social policy. Indeed,
judicialization of the high sort has helped create the conditions that aﬄict the
low sort. In a system committed to general rules, the elaboration of a rich set
of procedures to handle “complex” litigation in high-stakes policy areas has
steadily priced many litigants out of the market for legal services elsewhere
in the system. PeopleLaw—the segment of the legal services industry that
represents individuals, as compared to BigLaw’s entity-focused practice—has
steadily shrunk.34 While access-to-justice advocates clamor for simpliﬁed
procedures to lower the cost of legal representation and allow litigants to go
it alone, the system’s transprocedural impulse and the growing complexity of
big-ticket litigation has pushed the system in the other direction, yielding a
costly menu of Cadillac procedures that apply even in cases where a Ford
might do.35
There remain, of course, important debates about the causes of the
American resort to courts and litigation compared to other advanced

33 For a powerful statement, see Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts
Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDULUS 128, 128, 129-30 (2019). See also Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx
Mark, Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, COVID, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEX. L. REV.
ONLINE 10, 11 (2020) (“Even before the pandemic, as other branches of government failed to address
inequality, state civil courts became the government actor of last resort for the tens of millions of
American each year who suﬀer the consequences of these failures.”).
34 Bill Henderson, The Decline of the PeopleLaw Sector (037), LEGAL EVOLUTION (Nov. 19, 2017),
https://www.legalevolution.org/2017/11/decline-peoplelaw-sector-037 [https://perma.cc/JV7D-K2KN].
35 See Burbank, “General Rules”, supra note 20, at 563.
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democracies.36 Likewise there are hard questions about the shape and success
of the more recent anti-litigation “counter-revolution” that has sought to
reverse and retrench the American turn to litigation.37 For Professor Burbank,
retrenchment eﬀorts exhibit a baleful mix of abdication and fecklessness:
credulous rulemakers who have bought into an empirically shaky narrative
about “cost and delay” in litigation; feckless legislators who have caved to
powerful incentives to submerge unpopular policies in litigation-squelching
statutory procedures while refusing to provide alternative policy vehicles, be
it social insurance or agency enforcement;38 and a cynical Supreme Court that
uses decisional law to amend rules (though disclaims doing so) knowing that
procedural arcana will ﬂy below the public radar.39 While some might
disagree with one or more of these Burbank-ian broadsides, a larger point
seems undeniable: litigation’s centrality in American policymaking means
that procedure will, for the foreseeable future, remain a lightning rod—one
of the foremost battlegrounds in America politics, even if many of the key
battles play out behind the scenes.
C. Empirical Method
A third and ﬁnal tectonic change that is central to any high-level
accounting of the past and present of American procedure—and yet another
place where Professor Burbank has done invaluable, ﬁeld-shaping work—is
the growing store of empirical knowledge about the system’s workings and
eﬀects. As with the other tectonic moves in American procedure, this trend
has been jagged rather than straight. Indeed, perhaps more so than the others,
it is as much a perennial challenge as a chartable trend. Still, the steady
reﬁnement of empirical methods, the ﬂowering of “empirical legal studies,”
and the growing digitization and dataﬁcation of courts and litigation have
generated ever-greater, though far from perfect, transparency over the
workings of the system and the consequences of procedural choices.
Yet procedure’s empirical turn has been a double-edged sword. Knowing
forum shopping’s eﬀect on case outcomes,40 or Rule 11’s actual deployment
36 See David Freeman Engstrom & David Hausman, Rights, Redistribution, and the Rise of the
“Litigation State”: The Case of Disability Discrimination, 46 LAW & SOC. INQ. 788, 788-91 (2021).
37 See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 7 (2017); Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering
Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years in the Trenches and in the Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
18, 29-34 (2019) [hereinafter Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence].
38 See Burbank, “General Rules,” supra note 20, at 560-64.
39 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 7, at 22-23; see also Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, supra note 37, at 31-32.
40 See William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Eﬀect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on
Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 151, 156-57 (2013) (reviewing empirical
studies of forum shopping).
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rate,41 or that Twombly has aﬀected certain cases more than others42 makes for
better rules. Empirical validation of rule choices can also protect rulemakers
from political incursions by allowing them to maintain the mantle of expertise
and objectivity and avoid the perception, just noted, that their work is merely
an extension of “normal” politics.43
Empiricism, however, brings as much peril as promise. Most obviously, a
growing store of empirical knowledge creates problems when rulemakers
ignore it.44 Litigation empirics are also just plain hard. Data is spotty.45
Pervasive selection dynamics mean that much of what passes for empiricism
may not be worth the paper it is written on.46 The stickiness of legal culture
further complicates rigorous inferences even with water-tight research
designs. The problem, as Professor Burbank once noted in the context of the
CJRA, is the lengthy time-horizons of quality research, since a procedure’s
long-run eﬀects cannot be captured until bench and bar have grown
comfortable with the new way of doing things.47 Finally, litigation empiricism
is hard in the American system because the commitment to general rules
disfavors “bottom up” solutions and so forecloses robust local
experimentation—perhaps the best source of variation on which to base
rigorous causal inferences about the impacts of rule choices.48
41 SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS, at ix-xi (1985); Carl
Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiﬀs and The Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1776-77 (1992).
42 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Eﬀects of Twombly and
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2273-78 (2012); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in
the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 376 (2016). See generally Engstrom, supra
note 8 (summarizing and critiquing the quantitative research scholars have completed on the eﬀects
of Twiqbal).
43 Marc Galanter, Bryant Garth, Deborah Hensler & Frances Kahn Zemans, How to Improve
Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185, 185, 230 (1994).
44 The Advisory Committee “studied indiﬀerence to empirical questions” in ramming through
changes to Rule 11 and Rule 26 did more than wake Congress from its 50-year slumber on procedure.
Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 22, at 841. The Advisory Committee also
lost the policymaking high ground at a key moment, when the opening up of rulemaking to public
view was already subtly eroding its legitimacy. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure, supra note 4, at 1950.
45 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2139-40
(2018) (reviewing data issues); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials”,
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415, 436 (2013).
46 See Engstrom, supra note 8, at 1206; Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and
Iqbal, supra note 42, at 376.
47 Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 241.
48 The best example is the CJRA, which committed to local, “bottom up” solutions rather than
national, “top down” solutions as the best way to make progress on perceived problems of expense
and delay, requiring each district to develop a plan. However, this created considerable tension
between national and local rulemaking, pitting the promise of new and creative solutions against the
perceived hit to uniformity and predictability. See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 680
(1997). Worse, the CJRA adopted a “bottom up” approach at the same time that the federal judiciary,
with Congress’s encouragement, was doing just the opposite: disciplining and narrowing local-level
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There are, however, two further ways in which procedure’s empirical turn
has impacted American procedure-making. The ﬁrst has come from Professor
Burbank himself, in his impressive recent scholarly work, noted previously,
laying bare the inner workings of federal-level rulemaking. That analysis
showed that the rulemaker ranks have become increasingly heavy on
Republican-nominated judges and defense lawyers and that the valence of the
Advisory Committee’s work—the amendments it proposes and pursues—has
followed accordingly.49 Time will tell the impact of this unmasking of a
process whose legitimacy was already taking hits, but it is unlikely to be good.
The second effect of procedure’s empirical turn runs deeper and exposes a
final peril in a system committed to general, substance-agnostic rules.
However incomplete, increased empirical transparency over litigation brings
with it an ability to gauge a rule’s substantive effects, pressing the entire
rulemaking enterprise into a perpetual, low-grade conflict with the system’s
transprocedural commitments and, more pointedly, the Enabling Act’s
antimodification mandate. As Professor Burbank’s seminal excavation of the
Enabling Act showed, its drafters imagined a line between Congress and
Court that placed off-limits to court supervisory rulemaking anything that has
a “predictable and identifiable effect” on the rights of person or property.50
Note, however, the catch-22 in an era of increasing empirical transparency: an
allocation standard keyed to the predictability of a rule’s impact would limit
court supervisory rulemaking to zones of irrelevance or speculation, where the
effects of rule changes are either negligible or empirically muddy. Once we
know that the 1993 version of Rule 11 kneecaps particular types of plaintiffs, or
that Twombly has a more robust effect on civil rights cases, both Rule 11 and
Twombly become, in a sense, substance-specific. The myth of
transsubstantivity and the legitimacy of American procedure-making, in other
words, rests at least in part on the system’s continuing opacity.
*

*

*

Plenty will disagree with some of these particulars. Some will say it paints
too morose a portrait of the state of American procedure-making. Sure,

disuniformity. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 230. Burbank’s warning
about the “temptation to make [diﬃcult] choices in local rules” reﬂected a more general unease with
local experimentation that continues to haunt the system. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law
Reform, supra note 22, at 854. For an overview of the CJRA and its short-lived localist impulse, see
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 145054 (1994).
49 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 19-20.
50 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, supra note 6, at 1114; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining substantive as affecting “primary conduct”).
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rulemakers have ignored empirical evidence. Sure, legislators have buried
social policy choices in statutory procedure without providing substitute
entitlements or enforcement capacity. And sure, courts have not always
owned up to their use of decisional law to amend procedural rules outside of
rulemaking. But all of this, one could argue, falls well short of abdication or
fecklessness. Rather, it is the usual mix of principle and institutional selfinterest that characterizes any complex policymaking system.
Others, however, will say it is not morose enough. From the vantage of
the 1990s, one could imagine Court and Congress, or Advisory Committee
and congressional committees, carving out a healthy, interbranch cooperation
on civil justice matters—a new “treaty” on procedure-making of the sort
Professor Burbank and others once called for.51 From the vantage of 2021,
however, appeals to “cooperation,” “genuine dialogue,” and “restraint in
assertions about power, prerogatives, and competence”52 ring hollow and even
naïve—a patrician’s call for civility as revolutionaries build barricades. Far
from a shared vision, nowadays it is all institutional fracture, with rules
pushed to their “hardball” maximum, the norms that sanded down their sharp
edges be damned, and a growing political polarization and nihilism that
preclude serious lawmaking and, worse for courts, have yielded a
dysfunctional and perhaps unsalvageable judicial selection process.53
But one need not be an apologist or alarmist to see the kernel of truth in
the basic story just told. American law’s transprocedural impulse, the
narrowing and delegitimation of court supervisory rulemaking, a bitterly
polarized and dysfunctional politics, and substantial shifts in the shape of the
civil justice system and the legal services industry that serves it have yielded
ever deeper pools of judicial discretion in areas where justice is meted out in
some of its most signiﬁcant forms, from sprawling MDLs and class actions
51 See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 22, at 517 (calling for Rules Enabling Act of
1998 in which the judiciary would “resume its primacy in civil justice reform but contemplates that
the branches will cooperate, with the judiciary taking the lead, in the formulation and promulgation
of reforms that would necessarily and obviously aﬀect substantive rights”; the Act would also make
“a national commitment to civil justice research” and “tighten[] national control on local procedural
experimentation”); Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 703-04 (1997) (imagining a world in
which “unilateral action [gives] way to pursuit of a shared vision, one that is informed by the fruits
of empirical inquiry or an appropriate surrogate, disciplined by awareness of that which is politically
feasible and crafted with technical expertise”). For other explorations, see Galanter et al., supra note
43, and Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role
in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1234-40 (1996) (calling for an Interbranch Commission on Law
Reform and the Judiciary).
52 Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 222.
53 See Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262 (2019)
(arguing that increased polarization aﬀects both judicial selection and litigation outcomes). See
generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
915 (2018).
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in federal courts to consumer debt collections and evictions at the state level.
Add to these dynamics a tighter empirical bead on the system’s workings and
the impact of rule choices, and you get a procedure-making process that is at
best embattled and at worst perpetually on the verge of crisis.
This, in turn, should be worrying because of the impending arrival of a
new tectonic force that seems likely to be every bit as important as the ones
that Professor Burbank has done so much to elucidate. A wave of digital legal
technologies is on the way and, in the years to come, will progressively move
to the center of the civil justice system. Tech is not something that Professor
Burbank much considered in his prodigious body of scholarship. But his
masterful mappings of the tectonics of a century of American procedure has
helped lay the groundwork for thinking about how civil procedure will
modulate legal tech’s continued advance and how judges, lawyers, and, in
particular, civil procedure scholars can help navigate that process.
II. THE LEGAL TECH CHALLENGE: RULE RECKONINGS
Ours is a technological age, and courts and litigation are no exception.
Indeed, lawyers, judges, academics, and entrepreneurs have begun to sketch
a portrait of a legal system that will be increasingly permeated by new digital
tools of various shapes and varieties—digitized litigation for a digitized era.
“Legal tech,” as some call it, is growing fast, though these tools defy quick
description.54 Various legal tech applications—e-discovery tools for managing
documents, back-oﬃce tools that automate billing, and web-based marketing
tools—have existed for decades. But legal tech’s most potent current forms
are uniﬁed by their reliance upon predictive analytics, particularly machine
learning, and it is here that we can expect the greatest leaps forward as
software increasingly performs advanced legal cognitions that supplement
and, at times, supplant lawyers’ work.55 Lawyers will increasingly rely on legal
tech to review documents and make privilege calls, predict case outcomes,
and generate pleadings and papers. The unrepresented, too, will beneﬁt from
the diﬀusion of technologies, from Q/A systems oﬀering legal advice to
document assembly software, to help them go it alone in court or resolve their
54 The very notion of “technology” in law is hard to corral. Litigation ﬁnance is a technology,
though not a digital one, that is quietly remaking the civil justice system. So are alternative legal
service providers. And digital technologies in law come in diﬀerent ﬂavors. Some are proximate to,
but not “of,” the legal system. A good example is the ways social media could re-engineer aggregate
litigation by making possible a new, “participatory” class action founded upon voice, not exit. See
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoﬀ, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846,
854, 856-57 (2017). Others are more directly involved in the provision of legal services or the
processing of cases. That is my focus in what follows.
55 See DANIEL SUSSKIND, A WORLD WITHOUT WORK: TECHNOLOGY, AUTOMATION, AND
HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND 77-97 (2020) (describing “task encroachment” in the lawyering context).
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disputes without engaging courts at all.56 But legal tech also includes
technologies that are, comparatively speaking, analog. The COVID-19
pandemic induced our normally hidebound courts to move a nontrivial
portion of the system online. Even as courthouse reopen their doors in a postCOVID world, a signiﬁcant amount of that digital migration will stick.
The precise contours of this newly digitized litigation system are as yet
unclear. A lively debate has begun to sketch long-run concerns, many of them
explored via thought experiments around “robojudges” and “robolawyers,”57
or even an eventual state of “legal singularity,” when machines can perfectly
predict the outcome of every case before it is ﬁled.58 Along the way, potent
new legal tech tools, we are told, will change law itself by collapsing standards
into rules and steadily shifting the jurisprudential foundation of the system
away from “equitable justice” and toward “codiﬁed justice,” crowding out
judicial discretion and values such as mercy or extenuation.59 In its most
bracing forms, speculation about the legal system’s digital future holds that
courthouses will cease to exist as physical places as adjudication moves from
courtrooms and law oﬃces to server farms.60
But if we lower our gaze to a more useful and tractable middle distance,
and if we take healthy account of Professor Burbank’s masterful mappings of
the past century of American procedure, we can see a set of more concrete
rule reckonings ahead, each a site of conﬂict where there will be substantial
work for judges, rulemakers, lawyers, and procedure scholars to do. Some of
these rule reckonings will be relatively straightforward. For instance, in the
near term, we’ll confront key questions about the technical speciﬁcations for
online systems and rules prescribing how, precisely, online court proceedings
will be made available to the public in order to cash out the “open court”
provisions that pepper American constitutions, statutes, and rules.61
56 See generally REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., LEGAL TECH FOR NONLAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF U.S. LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES (2019).
57 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1137-42 (2019); Milan
Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 349-50 (2019).
58 See Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J.
443, 445-46 (2016).
59 For a jurisprudential overview, see Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing
Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019). See also Anthony J. Casey &
Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1403 (2017) (ﬁnding that
technology removes the trade-oﬀ between rules and standards).
60 See MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & DANIEL N. ROCKMORE, Introduction: From Analogue to
Digital Legal Scholarship, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS, at xiv (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019). The less grandiose
version is Susskind’s notion that adjudication will become a “service” rather than a “place.” See
RICHARD SUSSKIND, ONLINE COURTS AND THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE 95 (2019).
61 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open court
unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules, or other rules adopted by the
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A pair of more challenging rule reckonings, however, will come in the
deep pools of judicial discretion created by our equity based system of
procedure. First are traﬃc rules that will govern entry into and exit from new
virtual fora—for instance, rules determining whether a case is heard in person
or online, and whether the judge, the parties, or neither get to make that
decision. Second are information rules that will govern the availability,
exchange, and use of the new troves of information generated by a rapidly
digitizing legal system. Examples include the proportionality and work
product rules that will govern the use of potent new software that performs
legal tasks, from e-discovery to outcome prediction, or rules governing
whether and how court-linked online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms
should arm disputants with data-based predictions about their prospects in
court to nudge them toward settlement.
Critical choices over this mix of traﬃc and information rules will
inaugurate a new digital era of American civil procedure, pressing on each of
the tectonic trends that have deﬁned American procedure in recent decades
and placing particular pressure on a system of procedure-making built around
judicial discretion. This Part oﬀers a taste of each.
A. Traﬃc Rules: “Virtual” Justice and the Migration Online
Start with a sweeping technological change that was already in motion
when the COVID-19 pandemic hit but exploded into view as infections
spread and courthouses shuttered: the migration of formal court proceedings
from in-person to online fora. The scale and scope of that process has been
stunning: since the pandemic began in March 2020, federal and state courts
alike have hosted millions of hours of proceedings online.62 Hundreds of
thousands of judges, lawyers, and court staﬀ have now paid the “switching
costs” that everyone else, in workplaces and schools the world over, have also
paid: downloading Zoom, buying laptops and webcams, and learning how to
artfully conceal wearing gym shorts to work. The “Zooming” of litigation, as
Supreme Court provide otherwise.”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
Numerous state constitutions have “open court” clauses. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course
of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (1995)
(canvassing the provisions). For a useful overview of the “open courts” doctrine, see Michael Pressman
& Michael Shammas, Memorandum: The Permissibility & Constitutionality of Jury Trial by Videoconference,
CIV. JURY PROJECT (May 4, 2020), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/memorandum-thepermissibility-constitutionality-of-jury-trial-by-videoconference [https://perma.cc/J9NC-SZB4].
62 See, e.g., Erika Rickard & Qudsiya Naqui, Coronavirus Accelerates State Court
Modernization Efforts, PEW (June 18, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2020/06/18/coronavirus-accelerates-state-court-modernization-efforts
[https://perma.cc/7SUS-7SYZ] (noting that the Michigan courts alone hosted 200,000 hours of
Zoom hearings during a single two-month span of the pandemic).
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Chief Judge Lee Rosenthal and coauthors recently put it, has worked a radical
change in the day-to-day operation of the courts—and, critically, a good
amount of it is likely to stick even after the pandemic recedes.63
Some of the procedural questions raised by virtual court proceedings are
strikingly basic. What degree of public access is necessary to satisfy “open
court” requirements? Does a full-time YouTube channel, as many courts
created during the pandemic, satisfy legal requirements,64 or does the digital
divide necessitate other forms of publicly funded digital access, whether
courthouse—or even community based kiosks? Likewise, when courts stream
proceedings, what are the minimum hardware requirements? And what are
best practices in terms of camera angles and lighting, to ensure meaningful
access and faithful translation from the in-person to the online versions?
Chief judges, court administrators, rulemakers, and legislators are already
hard at work crafting these rules, guidelines, and practices.65
Far harder will be traﬃc rules that determine which cases move online and
which ones remain in person—and, perhaps more importantly, who gets to
decide. Part of what will make these traﬃc rules diﬃcult is that it is unclear
what, precisely, is gained and lost online. On one hand, remote proceedings
can increase access to justice by lowering the cost of legal representation and
shrinking the ranks of those with justice needs who cannot aﬀord competent
counsel. Lawyers bill for the time it takes to travel to and from courthouses—
and to wait one’s turn once there. Transaction costs are especially high in the
parade of smaller-scale proceedings—status conferences, arguments on
motions trained on a speciﬁc piece of discovery or claim, and pretrial
hearings—that make up civil litigation.66 The amount of representation
available in any market-based legal system is endogenous to its cost. If the
cost of legal services declines, more people can aﬀord those services.
Less clear is what gets lost—the cost–beneﬁt ledger’s other side—in the
virtual migration. A commonly voiced concern is that online proceedings will
63 Scott Dodson, Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal & Christopher L. Dodson, The Zooming of Federal
Civil Litigation, 104 JUDICATURE 13, 13-17, 19 (2020).
64 U.S. CTS., Federal Courts Participate in Audio Livestream Pilot (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/12/15/federal-courts-participate-audio-livestreampilot?utm_campaign=usc-news&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
[https://perma.cc/ZT4J-CRRT]; TEX. OFF. OF CT. ADMIN., How to Create a YouTube Channel,
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1448819/how-to-youtube-channel-9120.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWW3-AN4Q].
65 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR FOR STATE CTS, REMOTE HEARINGS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE: DURING
COVID-19 AND BEYOND, https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/40365/RRT-TechnologyATJ-Remote-Hearings-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDQ3-TPWP]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POST-PANDEMIC COURT TECHNOLOGY: A PANDEMIC RESOURCE FROM
CCJ/COSCA (2020), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/42332/Guiding-Principles-forCourt-Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV35-DT4V].
66 The same is true of depositions taken in distant cities or towns.
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compromise crucial judgments about witness credibility. But the net eﬀects
are not obvious. After all, there’s both more and less on screen. Facial tics are
enhanced, bodily tics invisible.67 More fundamentally, social science suggests
we should not be overly concerned about the impairment of a judge or jury’s
capacity for deception detection during witness testimony. Our ability to
gauge truthfulness was already perilously close to a coin ﬂip, leaving little
room for further erosion.68 Nor is there an obvious hit to truth telling itself.
Conventionally understood, “open court” provisions and confrontation rights
curtail perjury by lending a sense of conscience to the proceedings and
keeping “triers keenly alive,” as the Supreme Court has put it, “to a sense of
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”69 But online,
livestreamed proceedings might be more publicly available, not less,
increasing the shaming power of watchful eyes.
The graver concern is likely to be distributive, and it will come not just at
trial or other proceedings featuring live testimony, but also in the ceaseless
stream of smaller-scale hearings and motions practice that do not. Two types
of concerns predominate: eﬃcacy and empathy. Eﬃcacy concerns are perhaps
easiest to see. The most pointed version comes where only one side can aﬀord
to appear in person, and so one side physically stands before judge or jury
and the other side is piped in. Yet even in a litigation system where both sides
of the “v.” are remote, one might worry about the eﬀects of a digital divide.70
If litigation’s haves enjoy access to stable Wi-Fi or high-production-value
digital demonstratives and its have-nots don’t, then the move online could
67 See, e.g., Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal
Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 LAW & POL’Y 211, 215-16 (2006).
68 See Charles F. Bond Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgements, 10
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 214, 214 (2006) (concluding, after an extensive meta-analysis,
that “people achieve an average of 54% correct lie–truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies
as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive”). See generally Renee Danser, D. James Greiner,
Elizabeth Guo & Erik Koltun, Remote Testimonial Fact-Finding, in LEGAL TECH AND THE FUTURE
OF CIVIL JUSTICE (David Freeman Engstrom ed., forthcoming 2022) (on ﬁle with author)
(reviewing the large body of research on detection deception, including the relative importance of
verbal and paraverbal cues, the relative competence of individuals and groups, and the possibility
that deception attribution might be biased against certain groups). For a recent exploration in the
popular press, see Jessica Seigel & Knowable Mag., You’ve Been Lied to About Lying, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/03/how-to-spot-a-liar/618425
[https://perma.cc/G7D6-JG4L].
69 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
70 The digital divide is both “ﬁrst-order” (that is, access to digital devices or broadband) and
“second-order” (that is, proﬁciency in using available technologies). See Victor D. Quintanilla, Kurt
Hugenberg, Margaret Hagan & Amy Gonzales, Digital Inequalities and Access to Justice, in LEGAL
TECH AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 68. That said, the digital divide may be
decreasing, including among racial and ethnic minorities. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, MAPPING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 1, 3 (2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/wh_digital_divide_issue_brief.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4KA8-A9ZL].
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exacerbate the distributive eﬀects—already pronounced in the analog, inperson context—within the legal system.71
Empathy effects are subtler and not easily disentangled from efficacy. A
small but flawed empirical literature—mostly observational studies from the
first time the system made a substantial move online in the 2000s—finds
worrying evidence that parties participating virtually do systematically
worse than counterparts participating in person across a range of contexts,
from bail hearings to immigration proceedings.72 While the precise
mechanism remains unclear, it seems likely that disparate outcomes occur
because virtual participants are less relatable on a two-dimensional screen
than their flesh-and-blood equivalents.73 Relatability might not matter
where two human parties appear virtually. Empathy (and also efficacy, for
that matter) are relative—positional goods, economists would say. But
moving litigation online could matter very much where one party is a person
and the other a disembodied corporation, systematically skewing outcomes
in favor of the latter.
Plainly more empirical work needs to be done on these and other
questions.74 Above all, our last round of empirical study came at a very
diﬀerent time, with high-latency, low-resolution systems that look nothing

71 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 125 ﬁg.3, 149 (1974); Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 652 (2010).
72 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Locke E. Bowman, Manyee Wong & Matthew M. Patton,
Eﬃciency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 869-70 (2010); Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Eﬀective Processing or AssemblyLine Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 259, 25971 (2008); Dane Thorley & Joshua Mitts, Trial by Skype: A Causality-Oriented Replication Exploring the
Use of Remote Video Adjudication in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 59 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 82,
82-83 (2019). That said, no randomized ﬁeld studies study the eﬀect of video conferencing, as against
face-to-face communication, on case outcomes. See Danser et al., supra note 68, manuscript at 8.
73 This, in any event, is the theorized mechanism of studies performed in other contexts,
including telemedicine and job interviews. See, e.g., Greg J. Sears, Haiyan Zhang, Willi H. Wiesner,
Rick D. Hackett & Yufei Yuan, A Comparative Assessment of Videoconference and Face-to-Face
Employment Interviews, 51 MGMT. DECISION 1733, 1742 (2013) (noting lower ratings for likability,
though not competence, in a job interview setting). That said, randomized ﬁeld studies in both of
these non-legal contexts ﬁnd that videoconferencing either has no eﬀect or can even benefit remote
participants. See Carlos De Las Cuevas, M. Teresa Arredondo, M. Fernanda Cabrera, Hubert
Sulzenbacher & Ulrich Meise, Randomized Clinical Trial of Telepsychiatry Through Videoconference
Versus Face-to-Face Conventional Psychiatric Treatment, 12 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH, 341, 347
(2006) (ﬁnding no eﬀect on medical decisions); Derek S. Chapman & Patricia M. Rowe, The Impact
of Videoconference Technology, Interview Structure, and Interviewer Gender on Interviewer Evaluations in
the Employment Interview: A Field Experiment, 74 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCH.,
279, 291 (2001) (ﬁnding that job interviewees were rated higher than their in-person counterparts).
74 For an initial eﬀort to understand some of the lessons from the pandemic-based migration
online, see Elizabeth Thornburg, Observing Online Courts: Lessons from the Pandemic, 54 FAM. L.Q.
181 (2021).
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like today’s Zoom, let alone the immersive telepresence systems that provide
a rich sense of colocation and are fast becoming the norm in corporate
America. As discussed further below, the migration online will present a new
frontier for empirically minded procedural research and new troves of data to
power it.75
For now, however, it is not hard to see the critically important implications
for the system’s adversarial architecture and the procedural rules that
structure it. First, the migration online brings complex trade-oﬀs from an
access-to-justice perspective. An all-online system might increase litigant
access by bringing legal representation, or an ability to appear pro se, within
the realm of possibility for low- or middle-income litigants who have been
priced out of the market for legal services. Digitization can thus dent the
access to justice concerns that have arisen as American social policy has been
steadily judicialized and as litigation’s growing complexity has sunk
PeopleLaw.76 But eﬃcacy or empathy eﬀects could skew case outcomes once
there. Armed with better technology, litigation’s haves might welcome the
online migration as one more way to come out ahead. We might open the
doors of the courthouse wider only to relegate some to its digital basement.
And new and easier online access to small claims can be regressive reforms
that do far more to beneﬁt the middle class.77 Importantly, these various
tradeoﬀs may play out diﬀerently across diﬀerent substantive litigation
contexts. The net eﬀect of the online migration may prove diﬀerent in
eviction cases than in consumer debt or prisoner cases, and diﬀerent still in
antitrust or other “complex” litigation areas.
If these trade-oﬀs are complex and variable, then the question of who
decides makes management of those trade-oﬀs even more so. In particular,
what mix of judicial discretion, party consent, and no-ﬂex rules makes sense
as a way to capture the eﬃciencies and access-to-justice beneﬁts of moving
online while blunting distributive impacts? The ﬁrst approach, and the one
embodied in existing federal rules, is to leave the move online to judicial
discretion. Rule 43 gives judges full discretion to “permit” remote testimony
“[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate

See infra Part III.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory Arbitration,
83 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2016) (“Paradoxically, access justice often beneﬁts various elites
while paid for directly by taxpayers and indirectly by weaker groups.” The result is a “regressive
cross-subsidy” “because groups that are not the intended targets of the intervention deploy access
and its beneﬁts disproportionately.”); Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Unintended Consequences:
The Regressive Eﬀects of Increased Access to Courts, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 27-28 (2017)
(concluding, based on empirical evidence, that raising jurisdictional limits in a small claims court
disproportionately increased better-heeled plaintiﬀs).
75
76
77
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safeguards.”78 A second possible approach comes by analogy to forum
selection—one of the few places in American procedure where judicial
discretion has been curtailed and something closer to ironclad party control
prevails. On this model, judicial discretion would yield to party consent by
making party agreements to move online presumptively valid.79 A third
approach is formalist per se rules, whether issued from rulemakers or
legislators, automatically moving certain types of cases—evictions, consumer
debt cases, prisoner cases—to a remote forum or making it a strong default.
One could even opt for a system that mixes and matches these approaches.
Rule 30(b)(4), as an example, sprinkles authority among parties and judge in
stating that “parties may stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that
a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means.”80 As William
Hubbard and Ronen Avraham point out, party consent and judicial discretion
exist along an often murky continuum.81
Each of these approaches has its virtues and vices, and it is not hard to
see some of the more salient tradeoﬀs. If remote proceedings are left up to
party consent, we might worry that consent could become a litigation tactic—
a bargaining chip that litigation’s haves could use to delay adjudication or
perhaps even extract concessions on discovery or other procedural rights from
have-nots.82 More concretely, a pro se litigant or a party with pro bono or
“low-bono” counsel might bargain away valuable discovery or other
procedural or substantive rights in order to secure a lower cost, virtual forum,
or that repeat players, unmoved by available concessions, might instead
FED. R. CIV. P. 43.
Note that the adoption of this approach could emerge even under the current rules. The
typical way to determine whether procedural defaults can be altered is by asking whether a procedure
is suﬃciently central to the mission of the courts and then denoting some procedures as falling
within a “core,” where party-stipulated deviations are not permitted, and others as falling outside
the “core,” where party-stipulated deviations are presumptively enforced save evidence of grossly
unfair bargaining leverage or other pathology. See generally Ronen Avraham & William H.J.
Hubbard, The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2020). If online proceedings
were found to fall outside the core, then perhaps party consent would trump even Rule 43’s seeming
vesting of discretion in trial judges.
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(4). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (noting that the parties may
stipulate, in addition to the taking of depositions, that “other procedures governing or limiting
discovery be modified”).
81 Hubbard & Avraham, supra note 79.
82 This may be one reason why some courts have made clear that trial judges have discretion
to compel a virtual move. See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., Thirty-Sixth Emergency Order Regarding the
COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 21-9026 (2021), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/
1451833/219026.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6RQ-GXRL] (“Subject only to constitutional limitations, all
courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staﬀ, parties,
attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant’s consent . . . allow or require anyone
involved in any hearing, deposition, or other proceeding of any kind—including but not limited to
a party, attorney, witness, court reporter, grand juror, or petit juror—to participate remotely, such
as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means. . . . .”).
78
79
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compel in-person proceedings to maximize the costs incurred by the one
shotters on the other side. Judicial discretion to parse these situations could
mitigate these concerns, but it could just as easily exacerbate them.
Here we can begin to glimpse the full extent of the procedural challenges
as large chunks of the system move (or stay) online. The trade-oﬀs between
eﬃciency, access, and equity are hard, and the empirical knowledge that can
guide the choice of rule architecture, or the exercise of judicial discretion
within a given architecture, is thin to nonexistent. The future of litigation
will turn on how well our rules of procedure, and our ways of proceduremaking, rise to meet these twin challenges.
That process is likely to look diﬀerent at the federal and state levels, but
there is reason for concern in both contexts. At the state level, a wider set of
options is available, including substance-speciﬁc rules and procedural
tracking, because of a weaker, more defeasible commitment to a “one size ﬁts
all” approach.83 This is important, for some of the most obvious
implementations—separate rules for speciﬁc types of cases or proceedings
where distributive concerns are thought especially acute—will require a
relaxation of transsubstantivity. But there are risks in such an approach. Any
proposed rule that is speciﬁc to, say, consumer debt cases will draw the
attention, and perhaps the ire, of a billion-dollar credit card industry. There
is a reason why, in the social welfare context, universalist programs like social
security are more politically robust and generous than residualist ones like
TANF or SNAP (food stamps).84 The question will be whether a rulemaking
process can produce rules that take account of the full set of procedural values
at stake, or whether it will instead yield a system that allows litigation’s haves
to gain judgments, wage garnishments, and eviction orders with ever more
ruthless eﬃciency.85
At the federal level, available options will, for better or worse, be more
limited. For starters, there are fewer discrete classes of high-volume cases that
might lend themselves to substance-speciﬁc rules.86 More fundamentally,
categorical, substance-speciﬁc, and no-ﬂex rules will be a harder sell at the
federal level because of the system’s transprocedural commitments and its

83 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the
“One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 394 nn.74–75 (2010).
84 PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE
POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 100-03 (1994).
85 Procedural debates tend to privilege results over process values. See Jane Donoghue, The
Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology, Public Participation and Access to Justice, 80 MOD. L. REV.
995, 1003 (2017) (“[L]egal processes are frequently evaluated on the basis of whether they are
eﬀective in achieving ‘good results’, rather than their capacity to serve process values.”).
86 The two types that come to mind are prisoner and social security cases.
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allergy to procedural tracking.87 If recent decades are any guide, federal level
procedure is instead likely to double down on judicial control, trusting in
judges to manage complex trade-oﬀs on a case-by-case basis and deepening
the pools of discretion that have deﬁned the past century of American
procedure. This approach may come out well. It may not. The paucity of
empirical knowledge to guide judges is worrying, particularly because the
near-term decisions judges make will set a trajectory for online proceedings
that may prove hard to undo, even if it becomes clear that more
thoroughgoing changes to the system’s procedural architecture, or a set of
substance-speciﬁc rules, are best.
B. Information Rules: From TAR Wars to Legal Tech’s Great Beyond
A second way to glimpse the rule reckonings that lie ahead in a digitized
system is to focus on legal tech in some of its most advanced forms: the suite of
lawyer driven tech tools that made their first and most significant inroads in ediscovery but are quickly moving to higher-order legal cognitions, from legal
analytics to outcome prediction. If the migration online will require new traffic
rules, the new digital lawyer’s toolkit will require adaptation of existing
information rules that shape who gets what information, when, and in what form.
As I have written elsewhere, the e-discovery variants of legal tech—often
referred to as “technology-assisted review” (TAR) or “predictive coding”—
are already spilling into deep pools of judicial discretion and pressing on the
American legal system’s adversarial architecture.88 For starters, TAR holds the
potential to reshape the system by fundamentally shifting the distribution of
litigation costs among litigants. TAR requires human lawyers to “label” a
subset of a corpus of documents for relevance or privilege that can be used to
train a machine learning system to ﬂag the rest. Implemented well—and that
is a key caveat—TAR performs better than purely human, eyes-on review,
and at a fraction of the cost.89
87 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 410 (2011) (discussing failed proposals
to impose non-negotiable limits on interrogatories and depositions in the discovery context).
88 See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Future
of Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1001, 1071-86 (2021).
89 For the two most frequently cited studies, see Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack,
Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Eﬀective and More Eﬃcient Than Exhaustive
Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011), and Herbert L. Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick
Oot, Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification vs. Manual Review,
61 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70 (2010). These two studies were the principal authority
in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), a leading case vouching for
TAR’s eﬃciencies. Others, however, are more skeptical about TAR’s current capabilities. See Robert
Keeling, Rishi Chhatwal, Peter Gronvall & Nathaniel Huber-Fliﬂet, Humans Against the Machines:
Reaﬃrming the Superiority of Human Attorneys in Legal Document Review and Examining the Limitations
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TAR’s potential eﬃciency gains are profoundly important, for rulemaking
in recent decades has been pre-occupied—some would say obsessed—with
litigation costs. Rulemakers have tried to mitigate cost concerns with
proportionality rules that require a judge to decide whether a discovery
request is proportional to case needs. But proportionality judgments are
tricky because TAR can yield gains in both eﬃciency and accuracy. For a
requesting party, more eﬃcient review justiﬁes more expansive searches,
including a wider net of custodians and fewer keyword searches to cull
documents prior to automated review. For a producing party, however,
accuracy gains mean a more generous bounty of documents.90 Put these
dynamics together and TAR has the potential to shift the “unit cost” of
discovery—that is, the average cost of each produced document—up, down,
or not at all. And it is judges, drawing from an implicit “set point” in terms
of tolerable cost, who will decide which it is. If trial judges exercise their
considerable discretion in ways that harness TAR’s eﬃciencies and reduce
discovery costs, rather than merely greenlighting more expansive discovery,
the eﬀect on civil litigation, from the availability of counsel to settlement
patterns, could be profound.91 Even Twombly’s plausibility pleading standard,
founded on concern about litigation cost asymmetries and plaintiﬀs’ ability
to externalize those costs onto defendants, might see its theoretical
foundation erode.92
If those were the only changes TAR put on the table, its propagation
throughout the civil justice system might generate only limited controversy.
But TAR is also spurring motions practice with deeper implications for the
system’s adversarial architecture via disputes over a party’s request for the
other side’s “seed set” or other technical details about its search and review
methodology in order to gauge the comprehensiveness of a production. And
these “seed set” disputes—an emerging “TAR wars”—are increasingly being
argued via the work product rule.

of Algorithmic Approaches to Discovery, 26 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 9-11 (2020) (deconstructing the
TREC evaluation process and showing the limited nature of its ﬁndings regarding TAR’s advantages
over human review).
90 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1317, 1354-55 (2019)
(providing a framework for considering proportionality issues in discovery); see also Ralph C. Losey,
Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A Marriage Made in Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L.
REV. 7, 15-16 (2013) (arguing that predictive coding is the answer to the proportionality doctrine);
Judge Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (suggesting that technology
will resolve the discovery problems it created).
91 See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Seeking Proportional Discovery: The Beginning of the End of
Procedural Uniformity in Civil Rules, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1948 (2018) (“Freeing states from the
binds of uniformity may, over time, encourage even broader procedural innovations.”).
92 See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1059.
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That rule, of course, now resides in Rule 26 and state-level equivalents but
was born in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor.93 In an iconic concurrence, Justice Jackson
wrote: “A common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.
Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.”94
Part of what the work product rule does is create a zone of privacy where
a lawyer can prepare her case without interference.95 But a deeper purpose is
to create the conditions necessary for a well-functioning adversarial system.96
Good lawyering, the thinking goes, will beget good lawyering if parties are
willing to pay for it. But parties will pay for it only if we prevent one side
from free-riding on the work of the other—in Justice Jackson’s terms, if we
prevent parties from borrowing the other side’s wits. But note as well the
deep distributive concern this brackets: some litigants can aﬀord better
lawyers than others. Such is the Hickman bargain: we tolerate inequalities in
the name of good lawyering.
Is a seed set work product? Some courts say no, some yes. Courts in the
“yes” camp say the seed set reveals attorney mental impressions the same way
as a list of “hot docs” used to prepare a deposition witness, as in the Third
Circuit’s Sporck case.97 That means near-absolute protection as “opinion” work
product. But strong or even absolute protection is worrying if you care about
a level litigation playing ﬁeld. TAR systems, like any machine learning
system, are “socio-technical assemblages,” not turnkey engines.98 An
important implication is that TAR is manipulable by humans in the tool’s
construction and tuning, and this manipulation can run the gamut from
outright abuse (e.g., fudging document labels or rigging the selection or
ﬁnetuning of models), to a more benign but still respondent friendly
calibration of the system to favor precision (the proportion of unresponsive
329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947) (establishing the work product doctrine).
Id. at 516.
Id. at 512 (“[T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of
preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal
procedure . . . .”); see also Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko,
A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359,
362 (1990) (describing how the work product doctrine “provides the level of conﬁdentiality needed
to induce the attorney to perform the optimal amount of legal investigation”); Jeﬀ A. Anderson,
Gena E. Cadieux, George E. Hays, Michael B. Hingerty & Richard J. Kaplan, The Work Product
Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 785 (1983) (describing how Hickman “preserv[ed] a zone of
privacy within which attorneys could work”).
96 Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1078 (“The work product doctrine creates the
conditions necessary for a well-functioning adversarial system by safeguarding returns on, and thus
investment in, legal talent.”).
97 Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985).
98 Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal
and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 985 (2016).
93
94
95
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documents allowed into a production) over recall (the proportion of
responsive documents identiﬁed).99 If litigation’s haves need not show their
work to the other side, then they can shade discovery to their advantage and
use their better technology and technologists (if the other side can aﬀord
technologists at all) to make sure it sticks.100
TAR is already attracting a rich law review literature exploring these
issues, including bracing proposals that would have courts adopt top-down,
rule-like protocols for collaborative use of TAR or even task the requesting
party, not the responding one, with formulating and conducting searches and
reviews.101 Each of these would shift, or even reset, the system’s traditional
commitment of discovery means and methods to parties with only sporadic
judicial involvement to referee disputes.102 The pay-oﬀs could be signiﬁcant.
As with other areas of algorithmic accountability, we could, despite pervasive
concern about AI’s “black box” opacity, end up with a discovery system that
is more transparent than at present about its costs and less prone to abuse.103
But compelled cooperation in discovery could just as easily erode litigant
autonomy and the system’s foundational commitment to adversarialism in
99 Compare Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Continuous Active Learning for TAR,
PRACTICAL L.J., April–May 2016, at 32, 37 (2016) (describing how machine-learning algorithms can
minimize discovery disputes between parties), with Neel Guha, Peter Henderson & Diego A.
Zambrano, How to Sabotage Legal Tech (May 7, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with
author) (cataloging the ways that TAR is gameable, particularly by litigants with greater technical
capacity and sophistication).
100 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 821, 863
(2018) (detailing how the “black-box” quality of predictive coding makes it harder for less
sophisticated litigants to challenge the predictive coding process).
101 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search
as a Solution to the In Terrorem Eﬀect of Externalized Discovery Costs, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1473, 1477
(2014) (“[T]he idea that allocating costs to the requesting party can be used to usefully limit the
scope and cost of discovery by improving litigant incentives is gaining acceptance.”). For an example
of a court-imposed protocol that has drawn criticism by providing for party–opponent validation,
see In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:16-cv-08637, 2018 WL 1146371, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 3, 2018) (setting forth a detailed protocol for search methodology and validation using TAR).
See also Christine Payne & Michelle Six, A Proposed Technology-Assisted Framework, LAW360 (Apr.
27, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1267032/a-proposed-technology-assistedreview-framework [https://perma.cc/ZY36-WCQN] (arguing that TAR has become “weaponized”
via court-imposed protocols that impose a higher standard and greater obligations on producing
parties than the analog discovery system does).
102 For a defense of the current “self-executing” system of discovery in which parties choose
their own means absent clear evidence of abuse, see Paul Weiner & Denise Backhouse,
“Transparency,” “Discovery-on-Discovery” Type Disclosures, and Party-Opponent Validation in eDiscovery,
70 LABOR L.J. 212, 213 (2019) (describing how the Federal Rules do not require parties to be
transparent in discovery).
103 For an example of the argument in the antidiscrimination context, see Jon Kleinberg, Jens
Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018) (describing how regulated algorithm designs will make proving
discrimination claims easier not harder).
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favor of something more judicially supervised and technologist
empowering.104 A collaborative approach could redirect the professional
standards and ethical obligations of lawyers away from clients and toward a
more diﬀuse fealty to the court and public. In Hickman terms, the market for
good lawyering could erode, however subtly.
The potential for a convulsive shift in American procedure is already
great, but TAR may also just be the canary in the coalmine. Reports reveal
that Walmart and other large companies facing recurring types of litigation—
including slip-and-falls and employment disputes—are actively working with
large law ﬁrms and technology companies to develop a new and potent legal
tech tools.105 These tools remain proprietary, but they appear to do two things
and confer two types of litigation advantages. First, they perform outcome
predictions, including the likely result of a case and the likely expense
incurred in litigating it given key case characteristics, including the identity
of plaintiﬀs’ counsel. The tools thus bring a heightened ability to do what
repeat players and litigation’s haves do to win out over one shotters and
litigation’s have-nots: settle out the cases with strong claims, litigate the
winners, and play the long game by playing for rules at the appellate level.106
Second, the new tools can reportedly generate pleadings and papers—an
answer, or an initial set of discovery requests—thus reducing litigation costs.
Much has been made of tools of this sort, and some commentators paint
a rosy portrait. Continued proliferation of such tools might level the litigation
playing ﬁeld by allowing smaller law ﬁrms to do battle with larger, corporatefacing, BigLaw ones.107 PeopleLaw, as just noted, might rebound. But it is just
as easy to paint a darker portrait. Indeed, over the near to medium term, a
convergence of factors may ensure that only litigation’s haves will be able to
develop potent legal tech applications and gain their advantages. After all,
large entities like Walmart may uniquely have the resources and capital access
necessary to build technical capacity.108 More importantly, it is large repeat
players who enjoy privileged access to data, particularly the holy grail of case

104 See Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1711
(2014) (discussing how judges and lawyers are “ceding control” of litigation procedure to experts
who prioritize “technological use and development above all else”).
105 See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1039-40 n.142.
106 See Galanter, supra note 71, at 125 (describing how favorable rules, favorable priorities, and
a party’s ability to structure transactions and “play for rules” as “repeat players” collectively
contribute to “haves” coming out ahead in litigation).
107 See, e.g., Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal
Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 457 (2016) (“[T]hese technologies increase accessibility to
legal services in a way that can beneﬁt lawyer and litigants alike.”).
108 Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1021-30 (cataloging the technical limits of NLP and
its requirements of signiﬁcant technical capacity and signiﬁcant manual lawyer inputs).
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outcome data that is otherwise unavailable within a system where secret
settlements predominate.109
If legal tech continues its advance and the haves have it and the have-nots
don’t, then it is not hard to see that litigation will increasingly feature requests
for production of the other side’s digital outputs. That might be a plaintiﬀ
seeking access to Walmart’s outcome prediction. It might be litigants, or even
a judge, demanding a party’s case-outcome predictions to see through its
motion to transfer venue on purely “convenience” grounds. And it might
involve a request for the outputs of a contract-analysis tool as a kind of parol
evidence about the drafter’s intent. Whatever the context, judges will
increasingly be asked whether machine outputs enjoy protection—that is,
whether borrowed bits should be treated the same as borrowed wits, even
where one side’s sharper wits reﬂect nothing more than its ability to pay for
the best software or its privileged access to data.
The rule reckonings for legal tech tools, particularly beyond TAR, are hard
to glimpse and necessarily speculative because they will depend on the arc of
technological development. But consider two broad observations that may
help structure future thinking.
First, the application of analog work product rules to new digital litigation
tools is not obvious. As just one example, advanced legal tech tools that
perform outcome predictions tend to be created far upstream, by teams of
lawyers and technologists long before any particular case arises; use of the
tool in a particular case, by contrast, may entail little more than a keystroke.
Machine outputs may thus qualify only for qualiﬁed protection under Rule
26(b)(3) as “fact” work product, not the near-absolute protection aﬀorded
“opinion” work product.110 Upstream development also implicates Rule
26(b)’s “in anticipation of litigation” requirement: many outcome-prediction
tools will have been created and ﬁnetuned neither during nor in anticipation
of any particular litigation; rather, they are created for all litigations.111 Past
case law, of course, says that case predictions, at least as to a speciﬁc case
rather than a cluster of cases, enjoy protection.112 But those decisions came in

109 The result is that most civil-side cases exit dockets with an uninformative voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41 or state equivalents.
110 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)–(B) (prescribing qualiﬁed protection for some materials,
commonly referred to as “fact” work product, absent a showing of need and hardship, but nearabsolute protection for materials, commonly referred to as “opinion” work product, that reﬂect
attorney “mental impressions”).
111 Id. (protecting from disclosure “documents and tangible things that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial”).
112 A good example is Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987), which held
that a defendant’s calculation of its aggregate damages exposure across cases was not protected work
product, but individual case calculations were.
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an analog world, with human lawyers, not machine learning models, poring
over case ﬁles to arrive at liability estimates.
Second, thinking through these options raises signiﬁcant questions about
whether procedure is the right vehicle to manage new digital information
ﬂows in the ﬁrst place. As with the traﬃc rules that will usher American
litigation online, the eﬃciency and distributive trade-oﬀs are complex, and
reliable empiricism on the eﬀects of one or another approach surprisingly
thin. Worse, compelled sharing of digital outputs in the name of blunting
legal tech’s distributive impacts will make those tools less valuable, reducing
party incentives to use them or the legal tech industry to produce them. After
all, the value of tools that provide information derives from their
exclusivity—that is, one side has them but the other does not.113 A procedural
regime that aims to level the playing ﬁeld might end up chilling legal tech’s
production and use in ways that make all worse oﬀ.
But if not trial judges operating within wide pools of discretion in our
equity-based system of procedure, then who? The current state of rulemaking,
and of our politics, makes it hard to imagine rulemakers or legislators
becoming involved, at least over the near to medium term. To that extent, it
seems likely that judges will be the front-line regulators of legal tech’s uptake
at a critical moment in its life. Still, the best long-term solutions may well lie
elsewhere, in the legislative creation and funding of “public option” legal tech
or, in the TAR context, the construction of courthouse e-discovery arms to
facilitate active judicial management of the discovery process.114 These
possibilities may seem far-fetched and futuristic—only a notch down from
pervasive predictions of robojudges and robolawyers. But if digitally driven
outcome disparities become too great and expose the dirty underbelly of the
Hickman bargain, momentum could steadily build, and it is not impossible to
imagine either or both approaches winning out. The result would be a seismic
change in American justice—a tech-based rethinking of some of our
adversarial system’s procedural cornerstones.
C. Traﬃc + Information Rules: From ODR 1.0 to ODR 2.0
A third set of rule reckonings comes with the online dispute resolution
(ODR) platforms—asynchronous online fora where parties can attempt to
bargain their way to settlement—that increasingly dot the civil justice

113 See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1089 (“[L]egal tools derive much of their value
from their exclusivity—i.e. the fact that one litigant has them and the other does not . . . .”).
114 It could also mean a legislative refashioning of liability standards to account for a newly
unlevel playing ﬁeld.
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landscape, both in the United States and elsewhere.115 ODR’s current
technological frontier combines the two technologies already discussed,
coupling an online forum with a range of algorithmic techniques, from
bidding systems to outcome-prediction engines, that provide key information
to disputants as they negotiate their way to settlement. New ODR platforms
thus sit out at more of a medium-term horizon than the simple online
migration of court proceedings or lawyer-driven legal tech tools. In time,
however, ODR may prove the most signiﬁcant of current legal tech
applications because it is likely to be the ﬁrst place that courts themselves,
rather than lawyers and litigants, deploy legal tech tools that perform higherorder legal cognitions.116 Indeed, ODR will be the bridge, if there is to be
one, to fully automated adjudication. Most important of all—and this is a key
point—the new ODR platforms will, perhaps unique among the current
menu of legal tech innovations, require a mix of traﬃc and information rules
to run well.
ODR is not new. The private sector has used it for years. Companies such
as eBay, Amazon, and Modria adjudicate tens of millions of mostly
commercial disputes per year, easily dwarﬁng the case ﬂows in all American
courts combined.117 In fact, the advent of private ODR was a prerequisite for
the emergence of the current e-commerce empire—a way to manage conﬂict
and create trust amidst rapid innovation in online markets that would have
quickly overwhelmed the relatively inelastic capacities of public courts.118
Court adoption of ODR, by contrast, is of more recent vintage. Indeed,
the ﬁrst major wave of court adoptions—that is, formally court-linked ODR

115 For overviews of ODR technology, see SUSSKIND, supra note 60, and ETHAN KATSH & ORNA
RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES (2017).
116 The “advanced” here is important. Many state courts are already providing online form
completion services. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform
Technology, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 1999 (2017); Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies through
E-Court Initiatives, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (2019) (discussing how courts in Michigan, Ohio,
and New York are innovating and developing online dispute resolution pilot projects to resolve
certain types of disputes).
117 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 10-11 (describing how eBay’s
SquareTrade software provided “some structure to the communication and to the ﬂow of
information between the parties,” allowing it to facilitate and “handle millions of disputes” over
time); Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 829, 837-50 (2021)
(discussing the diﬀerent dispute resolution strategies employed by online marketplace, social,
sharing, and search platforms).
118 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 14 (“No one—neither the courts, nor
alternative processes—is prepared to handle the volume, variety, and character of disputes that are
a by-product of the levels of creative and commercial activity happening online today.”).
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platforms119—came as recently as 2016.120 Since then, however, ODR has
steadily gained momentum, fueled by the emergence of multiple software
vendors vying for market share and a growing portfolio of pilots in
Michigan,121 Ohio,122 and Utah,123 among other states, and globally, from
Canada124 to the U.K.125 to Singapore.126 More recently, a pandemic-induced
torrent of civil ﬁlings has also spurred innovation, causing many state courts
to implement prehearing “diversion programs” to resolve rising eviction,
consumer debt, and other low-value but systemically important cases.127 By
late 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic began, some sixty-six state and
local courts had already piloted one or another ODR system.128 By the time
the pandemic ends, ODR may well be the new normal.
Currently, most of these court linked ODR platforms are just virtual
gathering places where disputants can engage, typically asynchronously, and
bargain their way to settlement without costly trips to court. They are “pajama
119 This distinguishes ODR platforms that operate outside the court system (e.g., GetAid,
SplitUp, AssetDivider) from platforms that are linked to the court system (e.g., Matterhorn).
120 For discussion on court adoption of ODR before 2016 and ﬁrst major court adoptions, see
Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
759, 773–75 (2012). Earlier eﬀorts, such as a court annexed ODR project in Michigan called “Cyber
Court,” quickly folded. See Brian A. Pappas, Online Court: Online Dispute Resolution and the Future of
Small Claims, 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10-11 (2008) (noting reasons for the Michigan Cyber Court’s
abandonment, including lack of funding and litigant privacy concerns); see also Lucille M. Ponte,
The Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the Development of the First Public Virtual Courthouse,
4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 51, 58-61 (2002) (discussing Michigan’s “Cyber Court” in detail, including the
composition of judges and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction).
121 See Oﬀ. of Disp. Resol., Resolve a Dispute Online with MI-Resolve, MICH. CTS., https://
courts.michigan.gov/administration/scao/oﬃcesprograms/odr/pages/mi-resolve.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SZ2Y-4ERG].
122 See generally J.J. Prescott & Alexander Sanchez, Platform Procedure: Using Technology to
Facilitate (Eﬃcient) Civil Settlement, in SELECTION AND DECISION IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AROUND
THE WORLD: EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2020).
123 PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, KATHRYN J. GENTHON, SUSANNE MITCHELL & DIVYA
MATHEW, IMPACT OF THE UTAH ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ODR) PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL
REPORT (2020), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/adr/id/66 [https://perma.cc/NF5RB7FE].
124 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 151 (describing a system in British
Columbia that hosts consumer disputes).
125 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60 at 166-68 (discussing the use of ODR platforms in England
and Wales).
126 Id. at 172-73.
127 See JOINT TECH. COMM., CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CT. MGMT.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON ODR AND OTHER VIRTUAL COURT
PROCESSES 1,5 (2020) (suggesting that the number of these types of disputes will likely rise during
the pandemic while U.S. courts have adopted ODR to handle their caseloads in the same period).
128 For an overview of adoption in the U.S. as of 2019, see C TR . FOR I NNOVATION ,
A.B.A, O NLINE D ISPUTE R ESOLUTION IN THE U NITED S TATES (2020), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/centers_commissions/center-for-innovation/online-disputeresolution-in-us [https://perma.cc/H3WG-TS23].
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justice,” as some call them.129 And, while ODR platforms are not merely
remote proceedings of the sort described in Section II.A,130 most current
court-linked ODR systems remain relatively straightforward technologically,
providing an asynchronous, 24/7 forum and, in some instances, access to
human facilitators who help disputants organize and classify their problems
and help inform them about their prospects and options.131
But there is a new type of ODR technology—call it ODR 2.0—that
provides disputants more than just a convenient gathering place or easy access
to human facilitators. ODR 2.0 incorporates algorithmic tools in order to
prime the parties with needed information without the need for a ﬂesh-andblood, human dispute handler.132 The most basic versions, long deployed in
private ODR systems, include double-blind bidding to ﬁnd overlap in the
parties’ reservation prices.133 Slightly more complex versions draw on the
parties’ conﬁdentially inputted preferences or even similar past disputes
within the system in order to present the disputants with settlement

129 Claire Osborn & Taylor Goldenstein, Area Judges Make Plans to Try Out “Pajama” Court,
STATESMAN NEWS NETWORK, https://www.statesman.com/news/20180618/area-judges-makeplans-to-try-out-pajama-court [https://perma.cc/K5LR-PJ5Z] (Sept. 25, 2018, 9:06 AM); Ali Linan,
Williamson County Commissioners Approve Pilot Program to Speed Up Small Claims Lawsuits, CMTY
IMPACT NEWSPAPER (June 5, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://communityimpact.com/georgetown/citycounty/2018/06/05/williamson-county-commissioners-approve-pilot-program-to-speed-up-smallclaims-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/9B3J-YA86].
130 See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice:
Should an Algorithm be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 485, 500 (2014) (“We argue that a
true ODR system is one that allows the parties to do more than merely complain—the platform
must involve the resolution of a dispute and use a neutral facilitator (mediation) or a neutral decision
maker (arbitration).”).
131 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 153 (noting “tools and methods to help lay people organize
and classify their cases (turning a grievance into a justiciable problem) and to analyse and reason
(coming to a legal view)”).
132 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 6 (suggesting technology alone can provide tools to court
users, such as helping them understand relevant law); KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note
115, at 47 (noting ODR’s shift from “a process that simply facilitates communication of information
to one that processes it”); see also John Zeleznikow, Can Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute
Resolution Enhance Efficiency and Effectiveness in Courts, 8 INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 30, 35-36 (2017)
(discussing the integration of artificial intelligence into ODR systems, which enhances the user’s
experience with the platform); Darin Thompson, Creating New Pathways to Justice Using Simple
Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution, 2 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RES. 4, 12-13 (2015)
(positing that “widespread adoption of [artificial intelligence] in the legal realm” can enhance
ODR platforms).
133 This approach, launched by ODR pioneer Cybersettle in 1998 and now a pervasive one,
has claimant and defendant submit their highest and lowest settlement numbers in search of overlap.
See Diane J. Levin, Cybersettle Makes the Case for Resolving Disputes Online, MEDIATION CHANNEL
(Feb. 20, 2008), https://mediationchannel.com/2008/02/20/cybersettle-makes-the-caseforresolving-disputes-online [https://perma.cc/9GVV-UH2K] (explaining that Cybersettle provides
disputants three opportunities to submit settlement oﬀers or demands and settles disputes when an
oﬀer is equal to or exceeds the opposing disputant’s demand).
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“packages” on issues in controversy.134 A still more sophisticated version
incorporates an outcome prediction engine that uses predictive analytics to
arm the parties with a BATNA—the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement—or a set of probabilities over multiple potential outcomes so they
can bargain in the shadow of what a court is likely to decide.135 One way of
thinking about this is that an AI-based ODR system replaces a human
mediator who, in the analog mediation context, would engage in a kind of
shuttle diplomacy, moving back and forth between the parties and “fogging
their glasses,” as one mediator put it, to nudge them toward settlement.136
Whatever the algorithmic method or the best analogy for describing it,
ODR’s clear future is to provide an automated, non-human, informational
bridge from legal claim to remedy.137
From a procedural perspective, ODR brings all the complexities of when
and how to migrate formal legal proceedings online—the traﬃc rules noted
previously. Indeed, ODR platforms raise the same complex trade-oﬀs among
eﬃciency and access values as online courts. On one hand, ODR’s
asynchronous and 24/7 nature means it can capture even more eﬃciencies
than remote proceedings, by making dispute resolution available despite the
work and childcare barriers that can impair the ability of those without
ﬁnancial wherewithal to participate in online but synchronous proceedings.138
134 Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato & Bruce Hiebert, ODR and eNegotiation, in ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 345 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & Daniel Rainey eds., 2012); KATSH
& RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 35-36, 49 (describing multiple systems and noting, with
reference to Smartsettle, that the “software examines the way in which the parties ranked their
interests and analyzes whether at least one of the parties’ interests can be better met without making
the other party worse oﬀ. If there is an alternative solution, the parties are presented with it; they
can then either choose the proposed agreement oﬀered by the software or remain with the resolution
they originally negotiated.”).
135 See Zeleznikow, supra note 132, at 39-40.
136 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 6, 298 (referring to ODR as “extended courts” and
suggesting that it can help disputants “understand relevant law and the options available to them”
and thus “giv[e] the self-represented some of the heft of a client with a lawyer”). For the “fogging”
notion, from former federal judge Vaughn Walker, see American Law Institute, Coping with COVID:
Administering Jury Trials, Mediations, and Complex Litigation, at 03:55-04:02, https://www.ali.org/
news/podcast/episode/coping-covid-jury-trials-mediations-complex-litigation
[https://perma.cc/72KB-84UY].
137 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 298 (noting that ODR can provide “a bridge, a connection,
between legal understanding and remedy”).
138 See Prescott, supra note 116, at 1999-2000 (suggesting ODR enhances access to justice by
allowing disputants to participate in negotiations at any time of day they choose regardless of
whether the other disputant participates at that time); see also Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott,
Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Eﬃciency, 21 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 205, 224, 227 (2016) (reporting suggestive data indicating “that a large fraction of the population
would ﬁnd it more convenient to address their legal issues at times when courts are closed” and
further describing how business hours–type availability can hamper attempts at “accessing justice”).

2278

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 2243

ODR is also highly scalable, unlike remote formal proceedings. It overcomes
the inelasticity of conventional, court-centered process that renders much of
the American system disproportionate and unaﬀordable for many parties
with small-dollar claims. On the other hand, ODR raises “equality of arms”
concerns, analogous to traditional court proceedings where one side has better
technology. Some courts have already set into place basic technological
requirements for ODR systems. For instance, there is consensus that ODR
platforms must be compatible with mobile technologies, which are the sole
source of online access for a nontrivial portion of the population.139 Some
courts have gone further, providing public kiosks clustered in communities
with wide digital divides where disputants can conﬁdentially engage.140
Debate over ODR traﬃc rules, however, will extend well beyond such
concerns, reigniting deeper, decades-old debates about mandatory, courtannexed ADR.141 A common concern as ADR proliferated in the 1980s and
1990s was its eﬀect on disadvantaged groups, who often do worse in informal,
less rulebound contexts.142 Co-optation of the system by lawyers—a concern
in adjudicatory systems designed to be accessible to lay litigants143—can

ODR also mitigates “system avoidance”—the notion that disputants might avoid courthouses
because of fear of criminal justice contact and the potential to be apprehended for outstanding
violations or of a more diﬀuse perception that interactions with police and courts are dangerous.
Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional Attachment,
79 AM. SOC. REV. 367, 371-72 (2014); Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313,
1317 (2012) (suggesting that for petty crimes, convictions are primarily a function of being arrested
for the oﬀense). Online participation may mitigate other psychological barriers: fear of speaking in
public, and shame (a particular concern in debt collection disputes). See Prescott, supra note 116, at
2007-08 (suggesting that court appearances create anxieties for pro se litigants, especially when the
dispute concerns failure-to-pay warrants). There are also social savings: bringing together the full
panoply of justice system actors—judges, parties, counsel, and others—for in-person proceedings is
costly. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 138, at 208-09 (noting this fact).
139 James E. Cabral, Abhijeet Chavan, Thomas M. Clarke, John Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough,
Linda Rexer, Jane Ribadeneyra & Richard Zorza, Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 268-69 (2012).
140 Id. at 269-70.
141 Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 95 MARQ. L.
REV. 993, 1007-10 (2012).
142 See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, David Hubbert, Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1359, 1360 (1985) (suggesting that informal ADR may lead to more “class-based prejudice”); Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991)
(concluding that mandatory mediation for custody disputes can be harmful to disputants because of
its implicit normative standards concerning speaking style and conduct).
143 See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1713-15 (2015); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 324-26 (1985) (observing that “[t]he regular introduction of lawyers” into proceedings
can erode informality and expedience).
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exacerbate these eﬀects.144 So might judges. The last time ADR swept into
court systems, some argued judges were using it to discard undesirable cases,
thus establishing diﬀerent tiers of justice that operated to restrict, rather than
expand, access to justice among the worst oﬀ.145 As with the migration of
formal court proceedings online, one might worry that ODR platforms, sold
as a way to empower those who tend to lose out in the analog litigation
system, will instead slide into a highly eﬃcient, Fordist system for creditors
and landlords to garnish wages and perfect evictions.
But to stop at traﬃc rules would be to dramatically understate the rule
reckonings that lie ahead as ODR proliferates. For ODR’s more advanced
versions also implicate information rules governing how information is
distributed, exchanged, and utilized. The easiest to see is in the choice of
technique ODR 2.0 uses to prime disputants with information as they bargain
toward settlement. As already noted, some current court-linked ODR
platforms rely on human facilitators to prime disputants with information,
making ODR an asynchronous version of the mediation-based ADR systems
that have been around since the 1980s. ODR 2.0 alters this picture by instead
using algorithmic add-ons that run the gamut from relatively simple bidding
systems to more advanced outcome-prediction engines that arm parties with
information about their prospects using data from past disputes within the
system.146 Importantly, the choice of algorithmic technique—and also the
more granular, technical choices made in its construction and ﬁnetuning—are
plainly procedural in the sense that they shape the information available to
the parties and provide the framework within which substantive outcomes are
pursued. But they also, as with procedure more generally, can shape
substance. ODR 2.0 thus oﬀers a concrete, procedural illustration of Larry
Lessig’s much cited notion that code is law.147
144 Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from
the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 420 (2005). Carrie MenkelMeadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of
ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1991) (suggesting various reforms to ADR to ensure that it
develops while enhancing trust in the legal system).
145 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 697-98 (noting concerns about creating
“diﬀerent classes of justice, with disfavored cases shunted to mandatory ADR”). Such concerns
persist: a recent study found an invisible layer of procedures applied by judges that functionally
barred many litigants from getting any kind of a live hearing in court. See Colleen F. Shanahan, The
Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215, 235-36
(2018) (providing data indicating the proportion of pre-hearing requests granted by judges and
suggesting such requests may serve to inhibit pro se litigants from accessing civil justice).
146 SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 159-63; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 46-49,
162-63.
147 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Some ODR
evangelists suggest otherwise and reassure us that ODR 2.0 systems can be “rule-implementing”
rather than “rule-creating.” See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 162-63 (asserting that ODR “should be
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This core fact about ODR 2.0 drastically complicates procedural debates
about its optimal design and implementation. To begin, ODR 2.0 will raise
the usual debate about the relative capacities of clinical and actuarial
judgment to mitigate and exacerbate human biases that arises in many
algorithmic decision-making contexts. Algorithmic tools, as a long literature
establishes, can be biased or inaccurate compared to human decision-makers,
but they can also perform better on both counts by reducing the cognitive
biases that can aﬄict human decisions.148 Focusing on this latter, biasreducing possibility, ODR’s champions claim it is a panacea, cutting the
Gordion knot that has forever aﬄicted adjudication by achieving better
eﬃciency and justice, rather than pursuing one at the expense of the other.149
However, those with technical command of machine learning’s possibilities
and limits know that this will not always be the case.
A second family of concerns raised by ODR 2.0, particularly those that
provide disputants with outcome predictions, echoes another part of the
decades-old debate about mandatory, court-annexed ADR: how directive
should alternative adjudication systems be, and at what cost to procedural
justice, litigant autonomy and self-determination, and the legitimacy and
remedial ﬂexibility they bring?150
A final concern that is likely to rise to the top of the list as ODR 2.0
proliferates is transparency, for ODR 2.0’s automated outcome predictions
will be deeply embedded in code that is opaque compared to the public
deliberative exercises and written down decisions of the analog court system.
It is, of course, easy to overstate transparency concerns. Judges are black boxes,
too, with reasoning left implicit or ambiguous—not to mention opinion-less
rulings from the bench.151 And yet, the inability of many advanced algorithmic
a rule-implementing and not a rule-creating process” and concluding that “[w]e cannot allow coding
to become law-making”). However, the porousness of the substance-procedure distinction means
that ODR’s more advanced forms most likely will always, to at least some extent, create rather than
merely implement rules.
148 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 103, at 115 (noting that algorithmic tools can mitigate or
exacerbate bias); KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 48-51 (same).
149 KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 165.
150 Boyarin, supra note 141, at 1007-10. Closely related are anxieties about ODR 2.0’s potential
to shrink available sources of information and counsel within the system. As noted previously, legal
tech is hatching numerous other non-state sources of information and guidance: websites, chatbots
and other QA (or “question and answer”) systems, livechats, webcasts, document construction
services, text message reminders, and more. See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 107 (describing “systems
and services” under the “heading of ‘public legal education’ or ‘legal empowerment . . .’”). But ODR
2.0 threatens to crowd out these more pluralistic sources of counsel and raises a concern, sounding
in political theory, about any one source of case-critical information, particularly a state-created one,
coming to dominate.
151 See Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-in, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. F. 233, 238 (2019) (noting that “both human and AI judges may be black boxes”); Eugene
Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1187 n.154 (2019) (“[I]t is hard to see why we should
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systems to provide any reasons at all is troubling. One plausible defense of
opacity, though hardly a complete one, begins by noting that ODR 2.0 collects,
uses, and makes available system-level data far beyond what is generated in
analog systems. Data can, in turn, be used to inform continuous process
improvement and even wider reforms, whether in courts or other branches of
government, aimed at preventing disputes from arising in the first place.152 As
Richard Susskind puts it, conventional courts have always had a high level of
“real-time transparency,” but a low level of “information transparency.”153
ODR 2.0 could flip this state of affairs and leave us better off than before, so
long as the scrutability lost when rules are embedded in code are offset by
gains in more actionable, system-level information.154
The billion dollar question for ODR, as with online courts or lawyerdriven legal tech tools, is once more who gets to decide the mix of rules, both
traﬃc and information, that will govern the new systems. Here, the
complexity of the eﬃciency and access trade-oﬀs presented by ODR raises
all the same traﬃc-related questions about the optimal mix of party control,
judicial discretion, and per se rules as does the online migration of formal
legal proceedings. But the information that ODR systems generate lead to a
wrinkle: traﬃc rules could themselves be automated. That is, decisions about
which litigants are pushed into ODR, or which among multiple ODR
systems they are pushed to, could be given over to machines wielding
predictive analytics.155

prefer the inscrutable silicon-based AI judge black box to the equally inscrutable carbon-based
human judge black box.”).
152 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 194 (calling for “visibility over . . . data about the
throughput and volumes of cases, their subject matter and value . . .”); see also Rebecca A. Johnson
& Tanina Rostain, Tool for Surveillance or Spotlight on Inequality? Big Data and the Law, 16 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 453, 466 (2020) (noting use of big data and computational harms to predict harms,
potentially obviating the need for legal process).
153 SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 194.
154 Id. at 199 (suggesting that increases in “information transparency” might offset reductions
in “real-time transparency”). For a jurisprudential version of the argument, see Brian Sheppard,
Warming Up to Inscrutability: How Technology Could Challenge Our Concept of Law, 68 U. TORONTO L.J.
36, 40-43 (2018). A nice way to capture all of this is to note that ODR is a system rather than a mere
tool. KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 35, 52 (noting how ODR “lift[s] the onus” of
obtaining justice from individual to entity); id. at 163 (“As courts increasingly rely on digital
technology and ODR systems, they will learn to view data as a central feature in dispute resolution.”).
155 SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 239 (noting the possibility that an algorithmic system “could
allocate hard cases to the traditional court without any human analysis and intervention and could
do so to a higher standard than case oﬃcers and judges . . .”). Mass adjudicatory agencies like the
Social Security Administration have already experimented with triage tools to push certain disability
beneﬁts cases—for instance, “easy grants”—into an alternative, staﬀ-overseen process rather than a
full-dress proceeding before an administrative judge. See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL
E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 83 (2020)
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That is just the beginning of ODR’s potentially radical implications for
American procedure, for the demands of devising rules for new ODR
platforms—particularly their information-priming algorithmic components—
fit awkwardly with past ways of American procedure-making and strongly
suggest the need for entirely new approaches. Judicial discretion might do when
it comes to refashioning proportionality or the work product doctrine as new
legal tech tools come into the system. But it seems positively unwise to leave
ODR 2.0’s design and implementation to court-only administration. Nor does
the design and oversight of ODR 2.0 fit well with the rulemaking process, at
least in its typical ex ante and drawn out forms. Instead, ODR 2.0 will require
something closer to ongoing, multistakeholder oversight via a process that
brings together judges, lawyers, technologists, and key stakeholders to develop,
finetune, monitor, amend, and, where necessary, decommission ODR systems.
Continuous oversight, not case-level judicial exercise of discretion or ex ante
specification of rules by rulemakers, would seem to be the order of the day.
Much work remains to be done to specify what a new multistakeholder
design and governance scheme could or should look like. One might start by
examining the various bodies, among them state access to justice
commissions, that have pioneered new approaches to adjudication and access
to justice in recent decades, from pro se court forms and self-help centers to
court navigator programs and limited scope lawyer and nonlawyer assistance
programs.156 More recent examples can be found in the rapid construction of
online “diversion programs” by many state courts during the COVID-19
pandemic to handle a crush of eviction and consumer debt cases.157 And a few
states are experimenting with or exploring a “regulatory sandbox” approach
to welcome new legal services providers into the system, including
software.158 Each of these approaches will require careful study to understand
(“The SSA’s tool for clustering like cases, for instance, potentially enables adjudicators to work
through cases more quickly and more equitably, improving the consistency of decision making.”).
156 This was also true of the various state-level access to justice commissions that various state
supreme courts created and charged with crafting responses to the pro se crisis. For more on state
access to justice commissions, see Access to Justice Commissions, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/atj-commissions
[https://perma.cc/8H2K-UP7P]; Justice for All, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/
jfa [https://perma.cc/9YWQ-8TD5].
157 For an example of a state-level program, see Mich. Sup. Ct., Priority Treatment and New Procedure
for Landlord/Tenant Cases, Administrative Order No. 2020-17 (2020), https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/
MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/court-rules-admin-matters/Administrative%20Orders/2020-08_2020-0609_FormattedOrder_AO2020-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/53GN-FC4Q]. For a local-level example, see
PINELLAS EVICTION DIVERSION PROGRAM, https://pinellasevictiondiversion.org/[https://perma.cc/
XCX4-7Y3C].
158 See, e.g., What We Do, OFF. OF LEGAL SERVS. INNOVATION, https://utahinnovationoffice.org/
about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/34DW-LSAA] (providing details on Utah’s sandbox pilot, including
what amounts to a regulatory agency as a gatekeeper for entry into the new, experimental system under
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which holds the most promise for the governance and oversight of ODR
systems. Only then can smart “who decides” decisions be made.
What is clear is that even the best-designed governance scheme will raise
many of the same anxieties that plagued the past several decades of
rulemaking. Questions will arise about the system’s capacity to make
empirically informed judgments about the eﬀects of design choices. The
process of system design and governance will also surely reﬂect the doubleedged sword of public ventilation of the rulemaking process. Perhaps a
modiﬁed, multistakeholder rulemaking process will be up to the task of
setting into place sensibly designed ODR systems that balance competing
values. After all, court innovation in response to the pandemic has, by most
accounts, gone smoothly. However, not nearly enough time has passed, or
studies done, to understand its contours, and nor can we be conﬁdent that
postpandemic political realities will be the same. Instead, it is not hard to
imagine that ODR’s post-pandemic career will fuel a further politicization of
procedure beyond even what we have seen in recent decades, with ODR
platforms designed to resolve consumer debt or eviction cases quickly
devolving into a politically charged extension of an often dysfunctional social
welfare politics. The ability of American procedure-making to manage that
kind of conﬂict in the past does not inspire conﬁdence. But the ability of the
American legal system to modulate legal tech’s coming will depend on it, and
we should hope that it can.
III. THE WAY FORWARD: A DIGITAL RESEARCH AGENDA
Part II sketched a set of rule reckonings that lie ahead as new digital
technologies make their way to the center of the civil justice system. Some
questions remain: what role might civil procedure scholars play in helping
judges and rulemakers navigate that process? And, to return to where we began,
what does Professor Burbank’s masterful body of scholarship teach us about
how to go about that work? There is not time here to lay out a full-scale research
agenda. But Professor Burbank’s efforts to surface the key tensions that have
defined the past century of American procedure can help us to glimpse a range
of critically important roles for legal scholars, and for proceduralists in
particular, as the American civil justice system moves into the digital future.
This concluding Part offers some brief observations about each.
Perhaps the easiest role to see is the one that procedural scholars,
including Professor Burbank, have always played: scholars must surface and
relaxed legal practice rules); see also Closing the Justice Gap Working Group, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees/Closing-the-Justice-Gap-WorkingGroup [https://perma.cc/25Q9-8JGQ] (describing a group appointed to consider a sandbox approach to
spur innovation in legal services delivery).
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analyze competing rule choices and deconstruct the eﬃciency, access,
distributive, and other trade-oﬀs raised by each. Some of this work will come
in the form of conventional but vitally important scholarship analogizing new
digitized procedural challenges to past procedural debates. As just one
example, we might seek to understand traﬃc rules for moving litigants into
and out of new virtual fora by reference to past debates over the enforceability
of forum selection agreements and concerns about forum shopping.
Yet litigation’s digitization will also inaugurate a new era of empirical legal
studies by raising crucial questions about the eﬀects of rule choices while
simultaneously creating vast new troves of data with which to answer them.
More than ever, the onus will be on civil procedure scholars—a Fourth Estate
of the procedural realm—to help judges exercise their considerable discretion
and navigate the shoals of a newly digitized civil justice system.
To perform that role well, proceduralists must, as Professor Burbank once
put it, “ﬁnd out the facts, in particular the facts about discretionary justice.”159
But judicial discretion’s eﬀects is only one type of empirical question to be
answered. What, precisely, is gained and lost in the migration of formal court
proceedings online? If the online migration is left up to party consent, how
much will strategic bargaining, with litigation’s haves using migration as a
bargaining chip against cost-conscious adversaries, shape access and
outcomes? And when might per se rules be the better choice? Turning to
lawyer-driven legal tech tools, just how great are the litigation advantages
conferred by potent new applications, from e-discovery to legal analytics to
outcome prediction, whether in choosing a forum, battling over discovery, or
negotiating toward settlement? Might the systemic gains from better
information, however unevenly distributed, exceed the distributive costs?
Finally, there’s ODR: how do diﬀerent modes of ODR, from ODR 1.0’s
virtual gathering places to ODR 2.0’s BATNA-generating outcome engines,
shape settlement outcomes? Is ODR 2.0 worth the candle? Might cost, not
information, be the sticking point in the run of minor but systemically
signiﬁcant cases that ODR currently targets? And how to keep the problems
that have aﬄicted ADR from aﬄicting ODR?
Exploiting new streams of data to answer these and other questions,
however, will not be easy. Selection bias, the bane of procedure empiricism,
will once more loom large when connecting traﬃc rules to case outcomes.
Without controlled and randomized experiments, true causal inference will
be elusive. In addition to these standard methodological challenges, the
online migration will yield a vast trove of new data, including digitized
courtroom footage, that will provide a ground-level look at litigation that

159

Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure, supra note 4, at 1940.
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could previously be achieved only by amassing written transcripts or doing
resource-intensive observational work in local courthouses. The diﬃculty of
these latter tasks may explain why we know so little about state and local
courts,160 and why the few procedure scholars who bother to do resource- and
time-intensive observational work generate such eye-popping insights.161 But
video transcripts will also require new methods, including some of the same
machine learning techniques that are powering new legal tech tools, to
interrogate the new mass of digitized data with any rigor. Professor Burbank’s
turn, well into his career, to rigorous, hard-edged empiricism can serve as a
model of the methodological innovation that will be necessary to fully exploit
the empirical fruits of a digitizing litigation system.
A second broad role for procedure scholars relates to the dataﬁcation that
digitization will bring: proceduralists can and must advocate for access to
data, not merely as fuel for scholarly evaluation and validation of rule choices
of the sort that Professor Burbank has long called for, but also as an
increasingly central determinant of access to justice. Legal tech tools can only
be as good as the data that power them. “Garbage in, garbage out”—a mantra
among algorithmic critics of all stripes—is no less applicable to legal tech
tools. A key implication, and the subject of an emerging “open court data”
movement, is that the decisions that judges, chief judges, and court
administrators make about data accessibility and infrastructure will shape the
innovation ecosystem and, by extension, help determine whether new legal
technologies serve all or only a privileged few. Though our constitutions,
statutes, and rules are dotted with “open court” provisions, court data has
long been some of the most closely held government data and some of the
hardest to dislodge. Charlotte Alexander, who is also one of the leaders of the
“open court data” movement just noted, puts it best: court records, from the
federal level on down, sit behind a “wall of cash and kludge.”162 This
combination of clunky user interfaces and paywalls place court records,
especially the bulk downloads needed to build potent legal tech applications,
beyond the reach of all but the most well-heeled law ﬁrms and tech

160 See, e.g., Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1034
(2020) (“[D]espite the place of local courts at the heart of the justice system . . . , we know very
little about them.”).
161 See, e.g., Jessica E. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, & Alyx Mark, Judges
and the Deregulation of Lawyer’s Monopoly, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2021) (showing how judges
have sought to manage the pro se crisis via a de facto deregulation of the legal services industry by
actively facilitating a “shadow network” of nonlawyer legal services providers in local courtrooms).
162 See Charlotte S. Alexander & Mohammad Javad Feizollahi, On Dragons, Caves, Teeth, and
Claws: Legal Analytics and the Problem of Court Data Access, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES:
THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH 95, 97 (Ryan Whalen
ed., 2020).
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companies.163 There are, to be sure, privacy concerns that must be
addressed.164 But ﬁnding a way to make court data more accessible is critical.
As legal tech tools move to the center of American litigation, access to data
will increasingly determine access to justice. Procedural scholars must show
how and why that is true.
A third and ﬁnal role for procedure scholars is more diﬀuse but perhaps
most important of all. Just as Professor Burbank’s scholarly work has so often
done, procedure scholars must strive to be the conscience of the system. The
most important way proceduralists can serve in this role is by self-consciously
serving as the principal, and a principled, line of defense against both over
and underreliance on new legal technologies.
Overreliance is the more commonly voiced concern these days given a
growing anti-tech zeitgeist.165 And with good reason. Technological change
163 Importantly, paywalls may get worse: state courts have digitized during the pandemic,
embracing e-ﬁling like never before. But COVID has also created powerful budgetary pressures that
will be felt for decades, particularly at the state and local level. These pressures will in turn provide
powerful incentives for courts to monetize their newly digitized records.
164 Scholars have only just begun to catalog the types of the sensitive information contained in
court records, chief among them locational, identity, health, and financial information as well as past
involvement in criminal or civil proceedings. David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court
Records: An Empirical Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1817 (2015). Some are predictable and
perhaps even relatively benign in the grand scheme of surveillance capitalism—for instance, the use of
divorce records to market fitness services to newly single women. See Karen Gottlieb, Using Court Record
Information for Marketing in the United States: It’s Public Information, What’s the Problem?, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 1, 2004), https://privacyrights.org/resources/using-court-recordinformation-marketing-united-states-its-public-information-whats [https://perma.cc/4CZR-ZSYR].
But others skirt or even cross lines. Civil court records are being used in pre-employment screenings
and consumer credit determinations, and they could plausibly be used by insurance companies. Michael
Klazema, What is Returned in a Civil History Background Check?, BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM (Dec. 28,
2018),
https://www.backgroundchecks.com/community/Post/5882/What-is-Returned-in-a-CivilHistory-Background-Check [https://perma.cc/KMQ5-4D5A]; see also CHECKR https://checkr.com
[https://perma.cc/VQ44-5JN8] (aspiring to “build a fairer future by breaking down the stigmas around
hiring people with criminal records”). An especially discomfiting example comes from reports that a
NYC landlord association scraped housing court records to create a blacklist of renters who had the gall
to try to vindicate their rights in housing court and should not be rented to. See Emily Myers, What is
the Tenant Blacklist and How Serious Is Being on It?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Oct. 19, 2020, 12:30 PM),
https://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2014/05/tenant_blacklist
[https://perma.cc/SG9Y-2JDG]
(describing a tenant blacklist that is provided to landlords who are vetting tenants during the rental
application process); Kim Barker & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Tenant Blacklist, Errors and Renters
With Little Recourse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/nyregion/newyork-housing-tenant-blacklist.html [https://perma.cc/6M7E-FAKB] (outlining how prospective
landlords use the tenant blacklist to “weed out risky tenants”); Ronda Kaysen, How to Escape the Dreaded
‘Tenant Blacklist’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/realestate/how-toescape-the-dreaded-tenant-blacklist.html [https://perma.cc/ES58-Y73Y] (“There are hundreds of
tenant screening bureaus, collecting names from courthouses around the country and selling the
information to landlords.”).
165 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2016) (“The law, so aggressively protective of secrecy in
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can move too quickly and sweep too broadly, bringing eﬃciencies that are
hard to resist while subverting less quantiﬁable process values or clear-eyed
assessments of what else is lost in the process. As Norm Spaulding has
pointed out, the downsides of transformative innovations, and even the
alternatives that were available at their adoption, are often swept under the
rug or lost to history once path dependence and the leverage of market
dominance sets in.166 This concern might prove especially acute for legal
technologies designed to supplant a litigation system that has drawn such
intense criticism, only some of it earned, about excessive cost, delay, and
adversarialism. We must continually ask what digitization—whether online
migration of court proceedings, automated delivery of legal services, or ODR
2.0—will increase access to. We must ask, in other words, what kind of justice,
and what kind of legal subject, they will combine to deliver.167 Only by
continually asking these questions can proceduralists guard against the risk
that digital’s scalability will lead to rapid adoption but an impoverished,
gutter system of justice in which the business case, with its emphasis on
eﬃciency and cost reduction, wins out over the sociotechnical or moral case
for or against a new approach.
While overreliance is likely to be the more commonly voiced concern, the
risk of underreliance on potentially transformative legal technologies is also
real, particularly in a system built upon judicial discretion. Lawyers are
cautious Burkeans at heart. We are trained to be hand-wringers, to see around
corners, and to come up with reasons not to do things. But if lawyers are
professionally disposed against automation, then judges are even more so. A
striking illustration is France, which recently banned judge-level analytics

the world of commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the privacy of persons.”); VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR 11 (2018) (“[P]oor and working-class people are targeted by new tools of digital
poverty management and face life-threatening consequences as a result.”); CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 13 (2016) (exploring harmful examples of mathematical models that
“aﬀect people at critical life moments”); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 17 (2019)
(“Surveillance capitalism is not an accident of overzealous technologists, but rather a rouge
capitalism that learned to cunningly exploit its historical conditions to ensure and defend its
success.”). For a measured rejoinder, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Economies of
Surveillance, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1280, 1283-85 (2020) (reviewing SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER
OF POWER (2019)).
166 Norman W. Spaulding, Online Dispute Resolution and the End of Adversarial Justice?, in LEGAL
TECH AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 68.
167 Id.
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outright after judges rose up against a law that made court data broadly
available to the public.168
There is, of course, little indication that the U.S. system, with its very
diﬀerent common law commitments and comfort with judicial policymaking,
will go the way of France. Still, at the highest precincts of our legal system,
judge sentiment might be moving in a similar direction. Consider this
progression: Justice Holmes, in his iconic The Path of the Law, wrote in 1897:
“For the rational study of the law, the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics.”169 Exactly ﬁfty years later, Justice Douglas sounded a much
sourer note: “The law is not a series of calculating machines where deﬁnitions
and answers come tumbling out when the right levers are pushed.”170 Fast
forward another seventy years to the present-day and Chief Justice Roberts,
who observed in a speech that technology “is putting signiﬁcant strain on how
the judiciary goes about doing things.”171 Soon after, he warned: “Beware the
robots . . . . My worry is not that machines will start thinking like us. I worry
that we will start thinking like machines.”172
These are just outtakes. They do not necessarily reﬂect underlying trends
in judicial thinking. But talk to virtually any judge about the coming of legal
tech, and you will ﬁnd at least some reason to worry that reﬂexive judicial
opposition to innovations could stymie salutary legal technologies from ever
seeing the light of day. Knee-jerk opposition could exacerbate distributive
concerns as TAR disputes mount and as courts, climbing out from the
COVID-19 pandemic, face the question of which parts of the system to
168 See Michael Livermore & Dan Rockmore, France Kicks Data Scientists Out of Its Courts,
SLATE (June 21, 2019, 7:30 AM) https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/france-has-banned-judicialanalytics-to-analyze-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/UW95-FF2K] (making “judicial analytics”
illegal); Jason Tashea, France Bans Publishing of Judicial Analytics and Prompts Criminal Penalty, A.B.A.
J. (June 7, 2019, 12:51 PM) https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-createscriminal-penalty-for-judicial-analytics [https://perma.cc/V73R-A5XE] (banning publication of
judicial analytics).
169 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
170 William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 104,
105 (1948).
171 See Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programssecret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/U29M-KENM].
172 Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Beware the Robots,’ Chief Justice Tells High School Graduates, ABA J.
(June 8, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/beware_the_robots_
chief_justice_tells_high_school_graduates [https://perma.cc/35JL-NE2R]. Chief Justice Roberts
also noted in his 2014 Year-End Report: “[T]he courts will often choose to be late to the harvest of
American ingenuity. Courts are simply diﬀerent in important respects when it comes to adopting
technology, including information technology.” CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2014 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2014), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2014year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/477H-BXLN].
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move—or keep—online, or which pandemic era “diversion” programs should
be built out into full-ﬂedged ODR systems. Worse, large companies will
continue to develop potent tools to gain a litigation advantage. So will
landlords, who already have the help of a growing menu of “proptech” tools
to automate evictions.173 But judicial aversion to new innovations, from
online proceedings to ODR 2.0, could stall tech innovation designed to
narrow the justice gap, leaving only legal tech applications that widen it.
There are, in short, profound risks and rewards on all sides. Managing
those risks, and realizing those rewards, will require a rich mix of oldfashioned thinking about procedural rules, a heavy dose of methodological
innovation, and clear-eyed thinking at all levels of abstraction about what
type of civil justice system we want to build as new technologies sweep into
it. Proceduralists have always been some of the best-positioned to do that
kind of thinking because they already work back and forth between
transcendental ideals and the messy realities that cabin the possibilities that
can feasibly emerge but may still be better than the status quo.174 As the next
generation of procedural scholars confronts these challenges and helps
decision-makers to do the same, there is no better model than Professor
Burbank’s rigorous, methodologically eclectic, and farseeing scholarship.

173 Erin Mcelroy, Meredith Whittaker & Genevieve Fried, COVID-19 Crisis Capitalism Comes
to Real Estate, BOSTON REV. (May 7, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-sciencenature/erin-mcelroy-meredith-whittaker-genevieve-fried-covid-19-crisis [https://perma.cc/7PN8ZH6W].
174 See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 88 (comparing “a comparative [versus] a transcendental
framework for the analysis and pursuit of justice.”).

